An attempt to arrest and prosecute an advocate while performing his professional duties amounted to interference with the process of fair trial

Alfred Nyandieka v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2020] eKLR
Constitutional Petition No. 14 of 2019
High Court at Kajiado
E C Mwita, J
October 23, 2020
Reported by Chelimo Eunice
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Constitutional Law – constitutional offices - office of the Director of Public Prosecutions - mandate of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions – independence of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions – whether the Director of Public Prosecution had absolute discretion when exercising its mandate - limitation on the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecution - whether any other person other than the Director of Public Prosecution would authorize commencement of a criminal prosecution - Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 157.
Constitutional Law – fundamental rights and freedoms – right to fair hearing - right to a fair trial - right of an accused person to be represented by an advocate of their choice – where there was an attempt to arrest and prosecute an accused person’s advocate while performing his professional duties –whether the accused person’s right to fair trial would be limited- whether such an attempt amounted to interference with the process of fair trial – Constitution of Kenya, 2010, articles 25(c) and 50.
Advocates – role of advocates – role of an advocate in a criminal trial – right of an advocate to effectively represent his clients - where there was an attempt to arrest and prosecute an advocate while performing his professional duties – whether such an attempt amounted to interference with the advocate’s right to effectively represent his clients.

Brief facts :
The petitioner, an advocate, sought various reliefs including an order of prohibition against the respondents preventing them from intimidating, harassing and threatening to arrest and arraign him in court for a charge of trespass in relation to his handling of the issues surrounding a parcel of land (the land) on which one of his clients resided. He averred that he was discharging his professional duties by representing clients in a criminal case in which they were charged with an offence relating to the land. Further, that he went to the land to take instructions, meet witnesses and prepare his clients’ defence but later learnt that his client and the witnesses he had identified had been arrested and charged with trespass on the land and that on July 12, 2019, two persons visited his chambers purporting to have an arrest warrant they wanted to execute against him for trespassing onto the land. The petitioner also averred that the respondents were victimizing him for performing his professional duties, thus threatening and intimidating him for pursuing justice for his clients over the land.
The respondents opposed the petition arguing that the petitioner had all along known that his client was not the owner of the land yet he went to the land, took several photographs and held a meeting on the land as leader of the meeting but not as a by-stander and that he was inciting the people present. They further submitted that investigations were conducted in good faith and that the other persons who trespassed on the land had been charged.

Issues:
  1. Whether the Director of Public Prosecution had absolute discretion when exercising its mandate.
  2. Whether any person other than the Director of Public Prosecution had the power to authorize the commencement of criminal prosecution.
  3. Whether an accused person’s right to fair trial would be limited.
  4. Whether an attempt to arrest and prosecute an advocate while performing his professional duties amounted to interference with the process of fair trial.
  5. Whether an attempt to arrest and prosecute an advocate while performing his professional duties amounted to interference with the advocate’s right to effectively represent his clients.
Held:
  1. The 1st respondent held a constitutional office established under article 157 of the Constitution, whose mandate was stipulated under the same article. Article 157 (10) of the Constitution stipulated that in the exercise of his mandate, the 1st respondent did not have to seek permission, direction or consent from any person or authority. The 1st respondent was required to act independently when executing his mandate.
  2. The 1st respondent’s mandate was not an absolute discretion. The Constitution itself placed a caveat on his mandate. Article 157(11) of the Constitution provided that in exercising the powers conferred on him, the 1st respondent had to have That was a constitutional command that the 1st respondent had to always have in mind whenever exercising his constitutional mandate.
  3. Whereas the Constitution conferred on the 1st and 2nd respondents mandate to institute prosecution and investigate respectively, they had to act in good faith lest the court would interfere with their mandate. When called upon to decide whether or not to interfere with the discretion of the 1st respondent to prosecute, the court would make a tentative and objective finding on the legality of the charges and the prospect of a conviction.
  4. Whereas the 1st and 2nd respondents had the mandate to discharge and that they acted independently, they had to act in good faith devoid of malice and ulterior motives. The court would, in appropriate cases, halt prosecution if instituted for reasons other than pursuit of justice.
  5. Article 50(2) of the Constitution guaranteed every accused person the right to a fair trial. That right included the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved, to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and to choose and be represented by an advocate and to be informed of that right promptly. The petitioner’s clients had a right to be represented by an advocate of their choice and they appointed the petitioner as such advocate. The right to fair trial was one of the rights that were non derogable under article 25 (c) of the Constitution.
  6. There was no suggestion by the respondents that the petitioner was not on the land where his client resided to meet witnesses for that trial or that the petitioner was not on the land in his capacity as an advocate or that there was any court order barring his client from staying on that land pending the determination of the criminal cases or any other case. The respondents did not exercise their mandate in a manner that accorded with the Constitution and the law.The petitioner, as an officer of the court, was performing his professional duties when he went to the land where his client resided to meet witnesses and prepare for their defence. He could not be prevented from doing so yet the respondents expected him to discharge his professional duties without fear or favour and assist the court render justice in that case.
  7. It was fundamental to the legal system that an accused be given a fair trial according to the law. The accused had a right not to be tried unfairly or as an immunity against conviction otherwise than after a fair trial. Allowing the respondent’s quest to arrest and prosecute the petitioner for performing his professional duties was to countenance interference with the process of fair trial and independence of the Bar, a direct violation of the rule of law.
  8. An advocate did not take sides in a criminal trial. He acted on instructions, pleaded his client’s cause and assisted the court to do justice. The petitioner was not on the land to perpetuate a crime. He was there to prepare for his clients’ defence. The petitioner was trying to ensure that his clients get a fair trial in the case he was representing them as required by the Constitution and the law. In that respect, the respondents were not acting in good faith when they purported to arrest and prosecute the petitioner for discharging his professional duties.
  9. The role of an advocate in a trial was both constitutional and statutory. By seeking to prosecute the petitioner for visiting his client on the land he lived, although such stay would be under dispute, was also interfering with his clients’ right to a fair trial which was a non derogable right. The petitioner’s role was to assist the court do justice. He was not in the case as an inconvenience to the 1st respondent. He was obliged to assist the court get the truth in the case. He owed allegiance to a higher cause, the cause of truth and justice.
  10. The petitioner’s visit to his clients had to be seen from the context of the right of access to justice. The petitioner had an option to wait for his clients and witnesses in his chambers. He, however, opted to go where the witnesses were so that he could take their statements in preparation for his clients’ defence. His chambers being in Nairobi, it would have required his clients to take the witnesses to Nairobi which would certainly cost them more money to travel to and from Nairobi, without being sure that some of the people would indeed be witnesses. By deciding to go where the witnesses were, the petitioner acted in the best interest of his clients and was not to be victimized for performing his professional duties. The clients’ right to prepare for their defence and access to justice ought not be violated or compromised.
  11. The 1st and 2nd respondents’ intention to arrest and prosecute the petitioner was an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice and the rule of law, a fundamental value in criminal justice. The petitioner, as an advocate, was discharging his professional duties to enhance criminal justice. He could not be considered a criminal while acting in the course of his duties. The 1st and 2nd respondents being active players in the cases the petitioner was involved in on behalf of his clients were attempting to steal a march against the petitioner’s clients in those cases which amounted to improper motive.
  12. The 1st and 2nd respondents’ conduct was not only a violation of the petitioner’s clients’ right to be represented in a criminal trial by an advocate of their choice, but also interference with the petitioner’s right to effectively represent his clients which he could not do without adequate preparations including taking statements from witnesses.
  13. The advocate’s right to visit a client could not be turned into a criminal act capable of sustaining a criminal prosecution against the advocate performing his duties under the Constitution and the law. Allowing that to happen was to allow the 1st and 2nd respondents to intrude the advocate’s right to prepare and properly defend his client, and the client’s right to a proper and sound legal representation. There was no reason why the 1st and 2nd respondents were in a hurry to attempt to arrest and prosecute the petitioner for trespass when the issue of ownership of the land, if any, had not been resolved, thus putting the cart before the horse.
  14. There was the question of whether the 1st respondent approved arrest and prosecution of the petitioner. Although the mandate to commence criminal prosecution rested with the 1st respondent, there was no deposition that the investigation file was forwarded to the 1st respondent for consent to prosecute and he exercised his independent constitutional mandate and authorized the petitioner’s prosecution. Only the 1st respondent could authorize criminal prosecution which would then lead to an arrest. An OCS could not on his own, order arrest and prosecution of the petitioner. Such attempt was unconstitutional given that the petitioner was not arrested while committing an offence.
  15. There was no basis for attempting to arrest the petitioner with a view to prosecuting him given that he was discharging professional duties as opposed to deliberately committing a criminal offence. The 2nd respondent’s officers’ conduct was unlawful and reproachable in the circumstances of the case. The 1st respondent could not support their actions without appearing to compromise the petitioner’s clients’ right to a fair trial.
  16. The petitioner was not justified in praying for damages for alleged violations of his fundamental rights and freedoms. There was no evidence that he was arrested or prosecuted. There was only a visit to his chambers with the intention to arrest him and no more given that the police did not find him. There would be no basis or justification for awarding damages in the circumstances of the case.
Petition allowed with each party bearing own costs.
Orders
  1. A declaration issued that the intended arrest and arraignment of the petitioner in relation to his visiting his clients on Parcel Number XXX as an advocate, was an infringement and affront to the petitioner’s right to represent his clients and prepare for their defence contrary to article 50(2) of the Constitution
  2. An order of prohibition issued prohibiting the 1st and 2nd respondents together with their agents from arresting and prosecuting the petitioner in relation to his visiting his clients on Land Parcel Number XXX as an advocate and counsel of the accused in criminal cases relating to the said parcel of land.


Kenya Law
Case Updates Issue 045/2020
Case Summaries

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Appointments of the Chairperson and members to the Business Premises Rent Tribunal declared unconstitutional on grounds that the appointment process was not competitive and merit-based.

Bernard Odero Okello & another v Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization, Trade and Enterprise Development & another; Cyprian Mugambi Ngutari & 7 others (Interested Parties)
Petition 100 of 2020
(Consolidated with Petition 99 of 2020)
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi
M Onyango, J
October 30, 2020
Reported by Beryl Ikamari

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Constitutional Law - judiciary - definition of judicial officers - members of local tribunals - whether the chairperson and members of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal were judicial officers - Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 260; Judicial Service Act, (cap 185B), section 2.
Constitutional Law - judiciary - tribunals - appointment of the chairperson and members of a tribunal - role of the Judicial Service Commission - whether the Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and Enterprise Development had powers to appoint the chairperson and members of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal - Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 172(1)(c); Judicial Service Act, (cap 185B), section 32; Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act, (cap 301), section 11.
Constitutional Law - values and principles of public service - appointment to public office - equal opportunity for appointment, fair competition and merit as the basis for appointment - whether an appointment process where candidates were not informed of the vacancy, there were no applications, no shortlisting and no interviews conducted, was constitutional - Constitution of Kenya 2010, articles 10, 47 and 232; Public Service (Values and Principles) Act, No 1A of 2015, section 10.
Constitutional Law - fundamental rights and freedoms - equality and freedom from discrimination - two thirds gender principle - whether the appointment of only one woman and four men to Business Premises Rent Tribunal violated the two thirds gender principle - Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 27.
Constitutional Law - constitutionality of statutes - transitional and consequential provisions of the Constitution - establishment of tribunals by means of appointment by the relevant Minister under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act - role of the Judicial Service Commission in making such appointments under the Constitution - whether the assignment of the role of making such appointments to the Minister under the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act was unconstitutional - Constitution of Kenya 2010, Sixth Schedule, section 7; Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act, (cap 301), section 11.

Brief Facts
Via Gazette Notice No. 4244 published in the special issue of the Kenya Gazette on June 26, 2020, the Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and Enterprise Development (the 1st Respondent) made appointments to the Business Premises Rent Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons/members of the Tribunal were the 1st to 5th Interested Parties.
The petitioners challenged the appointments. They contended that the appointments were made in excess of power or without power and were contrary to section 11(1) of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act as read with rues 2 and 21 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishment) (Tribunal) (Forms and Procedures) Regulations, 1966. They added that the appointments were not made through a process where there was fair competition and merit and that as such they were contrary to the Constitution. They said that they were also discriminatory as a fair opportunity to apply for the appointments was not afforded to all members of the public and only one woman was appointed.
It was also contended by the petitioner that the members of the Tribunal were judicial officers and it was only the Judicial Service Commission that could appoint them. He argued that the principle of separation of powers was violated when powers of the Judicial Service Commission to appoint judicial officers was exercised by a Cabinet Secretary. Therefore, the Cabinet Secretary acted in excess of her powers when she made the appointments. It was further argued by the petitioner, that the appointments which had only one woman appointee out of five appointees discriminated against women.

Issue:

  1. Whether the Chairperson and members of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal were judicial officers.
  2. Whether the Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and Enterprise Development had powers to appoint the chairperson and members of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal.
  3. Whether appointments made to the Business Premises Rent Tribunal without following a process that was open and competitive, in that there were no applications made or interviews done, was constitutional.
  4. Whether the appointment of one woman and four men to Business Premises Rent Tribunal violated the two thirds gender principle.
  5. Whether section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act, which provided for the establishment of tribunals by means of appointment by the relevant Minister, was unconstitutional. Read More..

Held:

  1. The term judicial officer was defined in article 260 of the Constitution to mean a registrar, deputy registrar, magistrate, Kadhi or the presiding officer of a court established under article 169 (1) (d) of the Constitution. A further definition under section 2 of the Judicial Service Act provided that a judicial officer included a registrar, deputy registrar, magistrate, Kadhi or the presiding officer of any other court or local tribunal as may be established by an Act of Parliament, other than the courts established to hear and determine disputes relating to employment and labour relations and the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.
  2. The term "local tribunal" as utilised in article 169(1)(d) of the Constitution was intended to distinguish that term from the term "international tribunal." Under the Constitution, where the term "tribunal" was used, it referred to tribunals established under local legislation. Under the definition provided in article 260 of the Constitution, local tribunals were a form of subordinate courts and persons presiding in such local tribunals were judicial officers. The Chairperson and members of the Tribunal in question were therefore judicial officers.
  3. The legislation contemplated under article 169(2) of the Constitution had not been enacted. The Tribunals Bill 2015 had not been enacted. In the absence of such legislation, the Judicial Service Act remained the primary legislation in respect of appointments to local tribunals.
  4. Article 172(1)(c) of the Constitution as read with section 32 of the Judicial Service Act were the relevant provisions with respect to appointment of presiding officers of local tribunals. Therefore, the appointment of the 1st to 5th interested parties by the 1st respondent under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishments) Act was illegal.
  5. Appointments to public office had to be done through a process that was open, merit-based, inclusive and competitive. The nomination of the 1st to 5th Interested Parties was discriminatory and lacked the transparency and openness necessary to uphold the rule of law and promote fair administrative action. Those appointed to the Business Premises Rent Tribunal did not apply, were not shortlisted, and were never interviewed for the positions.
  6. The 1st to 5th interested parties contended that the challenge to the legality of their appointment would lead to administrative chaos which would not be in public interest. Public interest favoured respect for the Constitution and the law. Public interest could not be used to justify the violation of a statute or the Constitution.
  7. The doctrine of separation of powers only applied within the confines of the Constitution and the law. The rule of law was supreme and no justification was valid if it offended the rule of law. Expediently, costs, convenience and legitimate expectation could never be valid justifications unless they were within the confines of the law.
  8. Approval given for the impugned appointments by the Judicial Service Commission could not regularize that which was not legal.
  9. Section 10 of the Public Service (Values and Principles) Act provided for competition and merit-based appointments. In making the appointments, the Cabinet Secretary did not comply with the requirements of the said section 10. Applications for appointment could not be made in abstract. There had to be an announcement of a vacancy and a statement on the minimum qualifications, followed by shortlisting and interviews.
  10. Section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishment) Act provided for the establishment of tribunals by means of appointment by the Minister. Inter alia, section 7 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution provided that where a constitutional provision assigned a responsibility to a different state organ or public officer, other than the one that would otherwise be responsible for it, the Constitution would prevail to the extent of the conflict. Therefore, in view of an apparent conflict between section 7 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the Constitution would prevail.
  11. The solution to the constitutional non-conformity in section 11 of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal Act had been provided for under the Constitution and the legislation was not unconstitutional per se. The issue was not with the legislation but with its application and that application was addressed in section 7 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.
  12. Article 27 of the Constitution provided for equality and freedom from discrimination. It also provided for the gender rule to the effect that not more than two thirds of elective or appointive positions would be of the same gender. No valid reason had been given by the respondents for failure to appoint at least one third of women to the Tribunal. The legal fraternity was awash with women who met the qualifications that the respondents alleged they were looking for. All they needed to do was to advertise publicly for those qualified to apply.
  13. The 1st respondent was in breach of not only article 27 of the Constitution but also article 232(1)(i) of the Constitution by selecting only one woman appointee out of five appointees.
  14. Section 11(1) of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Business Establishment) Act did not prescribe the minimum or maximum number of members of the Tribunal. Therefore, the appointing authority had discretion on the number of members to the Tribunal.

Orders: -

  1. A declaration that the appointment of the 1st to 5th interested parties was in violation of articles 2, 10, 27, 47, 169(1)(d), 172(1), 232(1)(f) & (g) and 259 of the Constitution of Kenya, article 2 of CEDAW, article 2 of Maputo Protocol, section 32 of the Judicial Service Act together with section 10 of the Public Service (Values and Principles) Act.
  2. An order of certiorari quashing Gazette Notice No. 4244 dated June 22, 2020 issued by the Cabinet Secretary for Industrialization Trade and Enterprise Development and any consequential actions arising therefrom.
  3. Each party was to bear their own costs in both petition
JURISDICTION

Whether lands claimed to be ancestral lands dispossessed during colonial era would be returned to original native occupants or their descendants

Henry Wambega & 733 others v Attorney General & 9 others [2020] eKLR
Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2018
Environment and Land Court at Mombasa
S Munyao, J
October 22, 2020
Reported by Chelimo Eunice

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Jurisdiction – jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court – jurisdiction relating to historical land injustices – whether the National Land Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to handle claims of historical land injustices - situations when the Environment and Land Court could refer a matter to the National Land Commission for determination instead of determining it - whether courts would, in all circumstances exercise jurisdiction vested in them – Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 67(2)(e); National Land Commission Act, section 15.
Land Law – national Land Commission – duties of National Land Commission to investigate historical land injustices - claim that the suit lands were ancestral lands which were dispossessed from the claimants’ forefathers during colonial era – whether the National Land Commission would handle such a claim – what were the solutions to historical land injustices in Kenya - Constitution of Kenya, 2010, article 67(2)(e); National Land Commission Act, section 15.
Land Law - ancestral domain concept – meaning and basis of the ancestral domain concept – whether the concept of ancestral domain was applicable in Kenya - claim that the suit lands were ancestral lands which were dispossessed from the claimants’ forefathers during colonial era – whether such lands would be returned to the original native occupants or their descendants.

Brief Facts:
The petitioners claimed that they, or their forefathers, were the original inhabitants of various parcels of land measure over 800 acres (suit lands) owned by the 2nd – 7th and 9th respondents and asserted a right to be settled therein. They claimed that they, or their forefathers, were violently evicted from the suit lands. They also pleaded that being descendants of the original occupiers of the suit lands, their right to property had crystallized through the doctrine of ancestral domain or alternatively, through an implied inter-generational trust. They stated that their problems stemmed from the issuance of titles to the then registered owners without due regard to their occupation. They thus sought, among others, a declaration that the suit lands were ancestral lands and a declaration that they were entitled to have the suit lands declared trust land by virtue of the history of the land.
The respondents opposed the petition with the National Land Commission (NLC) arguing that the issues raised in the petition were of the nature of historical land injustice hence the appropriate avenue for seeking redress was by lodging a claim of historical injustice with the NLC for admission and subsequent investigation. That the issues raised in the petition were therefore prematurely before the court.

Issues:

  1. Whether the Environment and Land Court had jurisdiction to hear claims of historical land injustices.
  2. What were the situations in which the Environment and Land Court could refer a matter to the National Land Commission instead of determining it?
  3. What was the meaning and basis of the ancestral domain concept?
  4. Whether the concept of ancestral domain was applicable in Kenya.
  5. Whether lands claimed to be ancestral lands dispossessed during colonial era would be returned to original native occupants or their descendants.
  6. What were the solutions to historical land injustices in Kenya? Read More...

Held:

  1. The Environment and Land Court (ELC) had jurisdiction to hear claims even those based on historical land injustices. However, just because a court was vested with jurisdiction did not mean that in all cases, it would proceed to exercise that jurisdiction, especially where there was another body that also had capacity to hear that dispute. Depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, the court could defer jurisdiction to another body, or decline to take up the matter altogether, and that would not be because it had no jurisdiction, but because given the surrounding circumstances, it would be best for the court not to exercise its jurisdiction.
  2. With regard to historical injustices and the National Land Commission (NLC), article 67(2)(e) of the Constitution provided that one of the functions of the NLC was to initiate investigations into present or historical injustices and recommend appropriate redress. The function was embodied in section 15 of the National Land Commission Act. NLC had wide jurisdiction on historical injustices. When it came to the choice of filing a claim before the NLC or before the ELC, one needed to make an assessment of what task was required.
  3. If the facts were contested, with elaborate number of persons elaborate and not easy to verify them, and where a thorough investigative process was going to be needed, then probably the ELC would not be the best forum and it would be best that the NLC handled the matter. If a person filed such suit in ELC, the court, on being moved, or on its own volition, could refer the matter to the NLC for determination, rather than dismissing it outright. However, where facts were clear, the issues uncontested, and what was needed was for the court to determine the rights violated and the nature of redress, or the legal rights of the parties, then the court was at liberty to entertain the suit and determine it on its merits. In the instant case, the petitioners had opted to come to court and the court had admitted the petition and thus, it proceeded to determine it on merits.
  4. There was no evidence that any of the forefathers of the petitioners ever resided on the suit lands. One could not tell with precision and finality, which forefather of which petitioner resided in which land, and what sort of occupation such person had. Some of the petitioners appeared to have roots in Kwale and not within the site of the disputed lands. There was a claim of dispossession, but absolutely no evidence of who was dispossessed, by whom, and when exactly that occurred.
  5. The petitioners had not demonstrated any historical connection to the suit lands. When one was presenting a constitutional petition, then he had to back it up with cogent evidence. The petitioners needed to do more than just state that their forefathers were displaced and tortured. They ought to have provided cogent evidence of that, and there was none, save for hearsays which could not be proved. Some of the claims of the petitioners sounded like folklore. Slave trade was not there in the 1940s or 1950s in Kenya, and if there was any drawing and selling of blood, that would be criminal, even under the colonial laws.
  6. The petitioners did not give the court any generational tree to identify their ancestry and demonstrate that it was actually their forefathers who were occupying the suit lands. There was no evidence that any of the claims of torture occurred. Neither was there any evidence of imprisonment. It was impossible to hold that any of the events that were claimed by the petitioners actually occurred.
  7. It was impossible to connect the petitioners in any way to the suit lands. They had claimed that there were graves on the land, which was contested. But even assuming that there were graves on the land, there was no evidence that such and such grave was for the father or grandfather of any of the petitioners. Those could be graves of any person. Site notes of a judicial officer who visited the suit lands and her conclusion showed that none of the petitioners were on the land. What she observed were developments made by the current proprietors of the land.
  8. It was appreciated that there was a strong probability that some persons were indeed displaced by the colonialists on the suit lands, but nothing before the court showed that the persons so displaced were the forefathers of the petitioners.
  9. At the outset, the petitioners had hopelessly failed to tender any evidence of displacement, or any evidence of torture, either upon themselves or upon their forefathers. With that finding, there was no substratum in the petition and the same had to be dismissed.
  10. The ancestral domain claim would mean that a generation had a historical right to own land that was previously in the hands of their forefathers. It had some support in some jurisdictions, especially those with a minority population that was marginalized owing to colonialism or occupation by foreigners. Australia for instance enacted the Native Title Act, 1993, so as to inter alia appreciate that Australia was not terra nullius (land that was legally deemed to be unoccupied or uninhabited) at the advent of European occupation and to make amends to the native population that was dispossessed of land. The statute followed Australian High Court decision where the court pronounced itself on the native title, recognizing that there existed native title to land, the foundation of which was the traditional connection by the natives.
  11. Land issues were complex and were unique to each country. It followed that each country enacted laws that suited its circumstances. We could not impose what had been held in one jurisdiction into the country for Kenya’s circumstances could be different. Australia had a large population of European origin with the native Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islander people representing only 3.3% of the population. It would follow, therefore, that there would be reason in ensuring the protection of that minority group. The situation in Kenya was radically different, with the native inhabitants being the overwhelming majority.
  12. The proposition that government had not done its bit in enacting legislation to address historical land injustices was incorrect. The provisions of the Constitution at article 67(e) and section 15 of the NLC Act were some of the response of the government in addressing historical land injustices. In making those provisions, the people of Kenya had to balance the interests of those who were adversely affected by historical land injustices, and the interests of those that had title to land and expected the same to be protected.
  13. Article 40 of the Constitution, thus, protected the right to property, and among the rights noted therein, was that the state was not to deprive a person of property without prompt payment in full, of just compensation. The Constitution also categorized land into private, public, and community land. Article 64 of the Constitution on the other hand defined what consisted of private land. The right to own property in a private capacity was, thus, protected. Such property could not be taken away without good reason and without just compensation.
  14. There was no backing in the Constitution or in any law that would entitle the petitioners to the lands that were privately held by the 2nd - 7th and 9th respondents, even assuming that the lands were originally settled by the forefathers of the petitioners. There was no law that said that a person had to be settled in land that was previously owned by his/her forefather, irrespective of whether that land was privately owned. There was power to recommend restitution or compensation, if deemed appropriate, when dealing with historical injustices, but that was not to be construed to mean that a person had a right to be settled in land that belonged to his/her forefather who was dispossessed from it.
  15. There was agitation for land from people who claimed to have faced historical injustices. The agitation was most intense in the coastal region. There was certainly injustice caused by colonialism and people were displaced and their lives destabilized. But that did not just occur in the coastal region, it was countrywide. Persons were displaced in Central Kenya and Rift Valley, where the colonialists established the so called white highlands. The Maasai were also displaced from a huge swathe of what would otherwise comprise their native land. So too the Nandi in Uasin Gishu, the Kipsigis in Kericho, and even the Taita at the Coast. Almost every community that had good land in the eyes of the colonial settlers was dispossessed to pave way for colonial occupation. There were native reserves dotted all over the country where displaced indigenous persons were concentrated while the colonialists hogged all the prime land. That was unjust and unfair.
  16. Almost every other person in Kenya had been affected by the historical accident of colonial occupation. If all asserted that they had a right to be settled in the land that was originally occupied by their forefathers, it would open a pandora’s box and create an even bigger problem, for there would be a massive displacement of persons which would be catastrophic. Even Nairobi itself, with its Maasai origin, would be overrun. How to move on from the dark colonial past did not lie, in the circumstances of the country, by making an order for people to cede their land so that the original native occupants, or their descendants, be settled in it. Neither did the solution lie in invading land that one believed belonged to his ancestor, for that would be a total negation of the constitutional right to property.
  17. It was time to recognize that the solution to the land problem in Kenya, considering the country’s unique history and prevailing circumstances, did not lie in land invasion, or in asserting that land belonging to one’s forefather be given, as of right, to a descendant. Doing so would mean bearing the brunt on very innocent people, and that would lead to even more unfairness. Most of the purchased, through their hard earned money, or loans, the lands in question. They were investors and they had made sacrifices in order to invest. They were also Kenyans and they had a right to own land in any part of the country.
  18. The Constitution was alive to the fact that there were historical injustices. With a good case being presented, either before the ELC or before the NLC, there could be avenue for redress, but that avenue would not necessarily be an order for resettlement in the very land that was owned by the forefathers of such claimant/s. Redress certainly did not include the invasion of privately owned land and did not involve harassing persons who innocently purchased land. Title had to be respected even as historical injustices were being looked at.
  19. The Constitution respected title to private land. If one had title to land, the Constitution protected that title. The petitioners could not claim that their rights were any superior to the constitutionally protected rights of the title holders. One problem could not be solved by digging one hole to fill another. The solution to the land problem would not necessarily lie in giving out land. Other avenues of mitigating the effects needed to be looked at.
  20. There was no law that gave an individual a right to own land that was previously owned by his/her forefather. Kenyans did not deem it fit to introduce such a law and that had been after considering the circumstances prevailing in the country. It had not been shown that there was any illegality in the manner in which all the suit lands were acquired. It had not been shown that the respondents violated any rights. No right entitling the petitioners to settle or to be settled on the suit lands had been shown. The court was unable to order the respondents to surrender the suit lands to the petitioners, nor order the government to purchase the suit lands and settle the petitioners in it.
  21. The petitioners had gripe against the NLC, but that bile was misplaced. The petitioners did lodge a complaint before the NLC. There was a resolution, vide which the squatters on the land were settled. In relation to land owned by the 2nd respondent, the NLC had received a complaint by members of Buguluni community. There was also another complaint in relation to the land parcel owned by the 9th respondent. It had not been shown that the NLC had failed to act. Just because the NLC had not found it fit to order a resettlement of the petitioners in the land of the 2nd – 7th and 9th respondents did not mean that they had failed to act.
  22. There had not been a violation of the petitioners’ constitutional rights or any violation of the international instruments that the petitioners had mentioned.

Petition dismissed with costs payable jointly and/or severally by the petitioners.

LAND LAW

Charged property cannot be sold without the chargee’s consent

Paul Gatete Wangai & 13 others v Capital Realty Ltd & another [2020] eKLR
ELC. Case No. 123 of 2019
Environment and Land Court at Machakos
OA Angote
October 23, 2020
Reported by Kakai Toili

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Land Law – charges - rights and interest of a charge - nature of rights and interests of a chargee - whether charged property could be sold without the chargee’s consent - Land Act, 2012, section 87; Land Registration Act, 2012, sections 28(g) and 59.
Land Law – charges - default in making repayments - requirement relating to statutory notices issued before exercising remedies for default including the power of sale – what was the nature and content of the statutory notices - Land Act, 2012, section 90.
Civil Practice and Procedure – injunctions – temporary injunction - factors to be considered in granting a temporary injunction – prima facie case - what was the nature of a prima facie case.

Brief facts:
The plaintiffs filed the instant application seeking among others orders that; pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the court restrains the defendants from disposing, selling, transferring, taking possession of or in any way dealing with 13 maisonettes (maisonettes) situated on the suit property. The plaintiffs had entered into sale agreements with the 1st defendant for the purchase of the maisonettes and deposited their payments towards the purchase price into the vendor’s and the advocate’s bank accounts. The plaintiffs further claimed that between April 2014 and April 2015, the 1st defendant handed vacant possession of the maisonettes to them.
On October 14, 2019, the plaintiffs were served with a statutory notice dated October 7, 2019 indicating that the 2nd defendant would exercise its statutory power of sale over the maisonettes after the expiry of 40 days. The 1st defendant claimed that the 2nd defendant agreed to advance to it a total of Kshs 350,000,000 to finance the building of the project which included the maisonettes. The 1st defendant proceeded to charge the property in favour of the 2nd defendant and contended that it continued to service the loan and interest payments due to the 2nd defendant.
The 2nd defendant opposed the application and stated that the 1st defendant was granted a loan facility of Kshs 310,000,000 which loan was secured by a revolving charge on the suit property. It was further claimed that; a further loan of Kshs 40,000,000 was advanced to the 1st defendant, which was secured by a further charge over the suit property; the 1st defendant further executed a fixed and floating and a supplementary fixed and floating debenture on all its assets. The 2nd defendant claimed that the plaintiffs were cash buyers and that in terms of the escrow agreements, all monies in respect of the sale was to be deposited in the 1st defendant’s escrow account with the 2nd defendant and that the 2nd defendant was yet to receive the purchase price.
It was further claimed that the 2nd defendant wrote to the 1st defendant and the plaintiffs seeking for a handover of the agreements and proof of payment, however, there was no response and thus the 2nd defendant resorted to exercising its statutory power of sale.

Issue:

  1. Whether charged property could be sold without the chargee’s consent.
  2. What was the nature of the rights and interest of a chargee?
  3. What was the nature and content of the statutory notice issued to a chargor in default of making payments?
  4. What were the factors to be considered in granting a temporary injunction?
  5. What was the nature of a prima facie case? Read More...

Held:

  1. The conditions that had to be fulfilled before the court could exercise its discretion to grant a temporary injunction were that:
    1. the applicant had to show a prima facie case with a probability of success;
    2. the likelihood of the applicant suffering irreparable damage which would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages; and
    3. where the court was in doubt in respect of the two considerations, then the application would be decided on a balance of convenience.
  2. In civil cases, a prima facie case was a case in which on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude that there existed a right which had apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.
  3. The 1st defendant’s director had not explained in his affidavits why the 1st defendant did not deposit all the proceeds of the sale of the 66 units in the escrow account as agreed between the parties. Indeed, a perusal of the escrow account did not tally with the sales of the maisonettes as indicated in the 1st defendant’s status report. Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that the 2nd defendant, being the chargee, was made aware of the sales that the 1st defendant was making in strict compliance with the provisions of the charge, the further charge and the law.
  4. From section 87 of the Land Act, section 59 of the Land Registration Act and the charge documents, the agreements which the plaintiffs entered into with the 1st defendant would only be enforceable as against the 2nd defendant, whose interests on the suit property superseded the plaintiffs’ interest, after the 2nd defendant had given its consent, with evidence of the payment of the purchase price which was to be deposited in the escrow account.
  5. Although the plaintiffs had a beneficial interest in the suit property having purchased the same, the said interest was subordinate to the 2nd defendant’s interest as chargee. A charge was an overriding interest within the meaning of section 28(g) of the Land Registration Act, which meant that the rights and interest of a chargee in the charged property were rights in rem and therefore remained superior to any other interest even where there was a sale, transfer or any other disposition in the property. The 2nd defendant being the holder of the charge would have first priority over the suit property as long as the land remained charged. The plaintiffs had not exhibited any evidence to show that the 2nd defendant gave its consent before the maisonettes standing on the suit property were sold to them.
  6. As per clauses 8 and 9 of the charge and clauses 7.1 and 7.2 of the further charge, in the event of default or breach of the charge, the 2nd defendant was entitled at its option to sue for the repayment of the secured obligations and enforce the payment thereof and/or exercise the statutory powers, rights and privileges conferred on the chargee by law, including the right to sell the charged property. The plaintiffs had to have been aware that the suit property was charged, and that for any sale to be valid, the chargee was required to give its consent. All the plaintiffs were required to do was to conduct an official search on the suit property, and insist on the consent of the chargee before committing their money. They seemed to have missed that crucial step, which was a basic requirement in that kind of transactions.
  7. According to section 90 of the Land Act, a chargee was entitled to issue a three months’ notice in writing to a defaulting chargor, if the default persisted for one month. The notice was required to adequately inform the recipient of the nature and extent of the default. If the default consisted of non-payment of any money due under the charge, it had to specify the amount that had to be paid to rectify the default and the period within which it should be paid, not being less than three months. If the chargor did not comply with the notice within the stipulated time, the chargee was at liberty to exercise various remedies, including selling the charged land.
  8. The notice that was issued to the 1st defendant on June 24, 2019 specified the amount due and the period for repayment as prescribed by law. The 40 days notification of sale was also validly issued. After the lapse of the prescribed three months, the 1st defendant had made little effort to regularize its mortgage account. Instead of regularizing its account, it rushed to the High Court and sought for an injunction, the High Court dismissed the prayer for injunction.
  9. Considering that neither the plaintiffs nor the 1st defendant had repaid the amount due and owing to the 2nd defendant, or deposited all the proceeds of the sale in the escrow account as agreed, the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case with chances of success.
  10. The plaintiffs and the 1st defendant knew all along that the charging of the suit property would lead to the realization of the same if the amount due to the 2nd defendant was not repaid. Once a property was offered as a security, it by that very fact became a commodity for sale and there was no commodity for sale whose loss could not be compensated adequately in damages.

Application dismissed with costs; being a test suit, the ruling would apply mutatis mutandis to all the other pending applications seeking injunctive orders in the instant court between third parties on one hand and the defendants on the other hand, in respect to the maisonettes built on the suit property.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Failure to file an application for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in the name of the foreign representatives of a company is not fatal where they controlled the process

In re Cooperativa Muratori and Cementisti – CMC Di Ravenna (Insolvency) [2020] eKLR
Miscellaneous Application No E 627 of 2019
High Court at Nairobi
F Tuiyott, J
September 28, 2020
Reported by Kakai Toili

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Commercial Law – insolvency – cross-border insolvency - centre of main interests of a company – factors to consider in determining the centre of main interests of a company – place where the company had its registered office -where the company had its registered office in Italy and several branches in various parts of the world - whether by a company, which had its registered office in Italy, having branches in various parts of the world could rebut the presumption that its centre of main interests was in Italy - Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, article 16 paragraph 3.
Commercial Law - insolvency – cross-border insolvency - application for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings - institution of the application - nature of persons with the capacity to institute such an application - effect of the institution of such an application in the name of a debtor company as opposed to a foreign representative - where the foreign representatives of the company owned and controlled the process - Insolvency Act (No 18 of 2015), Fifth Schedule, paragraphs 4 and19(1).
Commercial Law - insolvency – cross-border insolvency - application for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings – requirement that certain documents from the foreign court may accompany the application - what was the rationale for the requirement in paragraph 17(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act, that an application for recognition of foreign proceedings be accompanied by certain documents - Insolvency Act (No 18 of 2015), Fifth Schedule, paragraph 17(2).
Commercial Law - insolvency – cross-border insolvency - application for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings – factors to consider in determining the application – public policy - circumstances in which the public policy exception could be applied - what was the nature and role of public policy – Insolvency Act (No 18 of 2015), Fifth Schedule, paragraphs 2 and 8(1); Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, article 6.
Words and Phrases – manifest – definition of manifest - clear, obvious, unquestionable - Black’s law Dictionary Tenth Edition.

Brief facts:
The applicant (company) was a company with its registered office in Italy and had branches in many parts of the world, including Kenya (CMC DI Ravenna, Kenya). The company was said to be beleaguered by debt and was undergoing voluntary agreement in the Court of Ravenna, Italy, (Italian Court). CMC DI Ravenna, Kenya, had been included and was part of the voluntary arrangement process in Italy. It was claimed that the preventive application by the company for an arrangement with creditors for purposes of restructuring its corporation debt was allowed by the Italian Court vide a decree dated June 12, 2019. The Italian Court appointed three people as judicial commissioners and overseers of the process of the voluntary administration.
The company claimed that the process in the Italian Court was a statutory process arising from provisions of Italian law akin to the procedure provided for under Part IX of the Insolvency Act No. 18 of 2015 on voluntary administration. The company thus sought among others that the court recognizes the foreign proceedings before the Italian Court where the company was a party.
The creditors of CMC DI Ravenna, Kenya, opposed the application and claimed that the application was incompetent for want of compliance with the Insolvency Act. The creditors further contended that grant of the orders was detrimental to the interests of the Kenyan creditors and that its sole intention was to avoid settling its obligations to pay and/or settle liabilities in Kenya. One of the creditors claimed that the Government had made significant payments to the company even for works which were yet to be complete. It was also claimed that there were criminal proceedings in Kenya related to two projects undertaken by CMC DI Ravenna, Kenya, and that the court should not interfere with the criminal process by granting the recognition.

Issue:

  1. Whether by a company, which had its registered office in Italy, having branches in various parts of the world could rebut the presumption that its centre of main interests was in Italy.
  2. Whether filing an application for recognition of foreign proceedings in the name of a company where the foreign representatives of the company owned and controlled the process was fatal.
  3. What was the rationale for the requirement in paragraph 17(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act, that an application for recognition of foreign proceedings be accompanied by certain documents?
  4. What was the nature and role of public policy?
  5. What were the circumstances in which the public policy exception in the recognition of foreign proceedings in cases of cross-border insolvency could be applied? Read More...

Relevant provisions of the law
Insolvency Act, 2015
Fifth Schedule
Paragraph 4
“foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, under to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and financial affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, either for the purpose of reorganisation or liquidation;
“foreign main proceeding” means a foreign proceeding taking place in a foreign State if the debtor has the centre of its main interests in that State;
“foreign non-main proceeding” means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking place in a foreign State if the debtor has a business establishment in that State;
“foreign representative” means a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorised in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganisation or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or financial affairs or to act as a representative in the foreign proceeding;

Paragraph 8(1)
(1) Nothing in this Schedule prevents the Court from refusing to take an action governed by this Schedule if the action is manifestly contrary to the public policy of Kenya.
(2) Before refusing to take an action under subparagraph (1), the Court shall consider whether it is necessary for the Attorney-General to appear and be heard on the question of the public policy of Kenya.”

Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
Article 16 Paragraph 3
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor’s registered, or habitual residence in the case of an individual is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main interests.

Held:

  1. A relief that could be granted by a court on recognition of foreign proceedings, whether main or non-main was set out in paragraph 23 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act. Paragraph 22 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act on the other hand gave the effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding. The effects of recognition of foreign main proceedings could be more drastic than that of a non-main proceeding. Under paragraph 22 and save for the power of the court to make certain exemptions, there was an automatic stay of commencement or continuation of proceedings against the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations, or liabilities, and execution against the debtor’s assets and suspension of transfer, encumbrance or disposal of any assets of the debtor.
  2. Foreign main proceedings meant foreign proceedings in a state where the debtor had its centre of main interests (COMI). The Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model law) in article 16 paragraph 3 provided for the presumption to be made concerning the COMI of the debtor. The applicant was a company with its registered office in Ravenna, Italy. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Italy was presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main interests. The onus was on the party seeking to displace that presumption to provide proof to the contrary. The mere assertion that the company had 30 branches and offices worldwide and that it had operations in Kenya, without more, could hardly be enough to rebut the presumption that the debtor’s COMI was at Italy where it had a registered office.
  3. Paragraph 19(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act provided that a court should recognize a foreign proceedings if, inter alia, the foreign representative applying for recognition was a person or a body within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act which defined a foreign representative. Ideally, it was the foreign representative bringing the action on behalf of the company who ought to be named as the applicant; nevertheless, though filed in the name of the company, the action was brought at the instigation of the foreign representatives. In so far as it was the foreign representatives and not the company who moved the court for recognition, the court chose not to make too much on the lapse in initiating the proceedings. It was the foreign representatives who owned and controlled the proceedings.
  4. The application complied with the requirements of paragraph 17(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act, the application was accompanied by a certified copy of the preventive application dated December 4, 2018, commencing the foreign proceedings and a certified copy of a decree dated June 12, 2019, appointing the foreign representatives. On the basis of those documents, of the existence of the foreign proceedings and of the appointment of the foreign representatives. The entire rationale of the rule in paragraph 17(2) was that the court had to be sufficiently assured that there existed foreign proceedings and of the appointment of the foreign representatives who presented the recognition application.
  5. The secured debt was not part of the process. None of the secured debts could be subject to any orders that the court could, in the end, be minded to issue.
  6. Questions of public policy were national in nature. Concepts differed from one state to the other. From the very nature of things, the expressions “public policy”, “opposed to public policy”, or “contrary to public policy” were incapable of precise definition. Public policy, however, was not the policy of a particular government. It connoted some matter which concerned the public good and the public interest. The concept of what was for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest had varied from time to time.
  7. As new concepts took the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy were upheld by the courts and similarly where there had been a well recognized head of public policy, the courts had not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and had at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There were two schools of thought;- the narrow view school and the broad view school. According to the former, courts could not create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenanced judicial law-making in that area.
  8. Public policy generally referred to the set of socio-cultural, legal political and economic values, norms and principles that were deemed so essential that no departure could be entertained. Public policy acted as a shield for safeguarding the public good, upholding justice and morality and preserving the deep rooted interest of a given society.
  9. Due to a risk of local manipulation to avoid international awards, it was essential that, when raised to resist recognition or enforcement, public policy was interpreted in a restrictive manner. It could not be generalized but rather a party seeking to rely on it had to show a well-settled and clear public policy so that a losing party was not seen to be merely engaged in a retaliatory exercise.
  10. Paragraph 8(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act provided an internal guide on how the public policy exception was to be applied in respect to cross-border insolvency recognition proceedings. The inclusion of the word manifest in that paragraph was not without significance. For the public policy exception to defeat recognition then it had to be that to grant recognition would be so clearly or plainly contrary to the public policy of Kenya. By inclusion of the word ‘manifest’ the public exception clause was intended to be invoked in exceptional and limited circumstances.
  11. The words in Kenya’s paragraph 8(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act were drawn from similar words of article 6 of the Model Law. Once a recognition application satisfied the procedural requirements of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act and demonstrated that it was aligned to the objectives of cross-border insolvency as set out in paragraph 2 of the Schedule, then the court in Kenya should lean towards granting recognition unless the action clearly fell within the public policy exception.
  12. To fail to have uniformed approach in dealing with the cross-border nature of the company business would lead to diverse and uncoordinated legal proceedings in various countries with the possibility of locking out creditors who lacked financial muscle to participate in multiple proceedings in different jurisdictions. That sounded laud and seemed to be in tandem with the object of fairly administrating cross-border insolvencies in a manner that protected the interests of all creditors.
  13. Inherent in Kenya signing the Model Law and in fact domesticating it vide the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act was the expectation that Kenya would cooperate with foreign courts and representatives on matters of cross-border insolvency. What could seem to be loss of some autonomy could be outweighed by the benefits to be gained by such cooperation (paragraph 2 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act).
  14. It could be in the public interest of a country to be a responsible member of the community of nationals by cooperating at the international level where it had promised such cooperation by embracing a treaty. However, it was critical that the recognition did not compromise the creditors’ right to equal protection of the law or access to justice. If that were to happen then to grant recognition to foreign proceedings would be inimical to the public policy of Kenya as it would be a direct affront to the rights provided by the Constitution.
  15. The relief to be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceeding could be fashioned in a manner that protected the interests of the local creditors. That was indeed the spirit of the flexibility offered by paragraph 24 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act. Regard was also given to the qualifications available under paragraph 22 of the Fifth Schedule to the Insolvency Act when a foreign main proceeding was recognized. The solution to the concerns of access to justice and unequal protection of the law lay in the court subscribing and determining the reliefs to be granted and conditions to be imposed upon the recognition. It was not with readily rejecting recognition applications.
  16. The stay order sought was not manifestly contrary to the public policy of Kenya, such an order would have been granted even if the insolvency proceedings were commenced in Kenya (section 8 of the Insolvency Act). It could not be any worse simply because it was granted pursuant to the recognition of foreign proceedings.
  17. The judgment for one of the creditors in Civil Suit No. 6523 of 2018, IOTA Excavations and Rental Limited v CMC DI Ravenna (Kenya Branch) Limited was obtained just three months after the date of the judgment yet from the proposal on restructuring, the company was indebted to creditors in different parts of the world. The foreign proceedings were not commenced purposely to defeat that creditor’s judgment.
  18. The allegations against the company and one of the creditors that the Government had made significant payments to the company even for works which were yet to be completed were allegations for which evidence had not been provided. Yet even if true, the concern of that creditor should be that the court should make an order that ensured that the company’s assets in Kenya did not leave the jurisdiction of the court so as to defeat a public debt. If the court were to grant the recognition order then it would be minded to formulate and impose such conditions that would protect public policy.
  19. The matter raised was fundamentally important that the court expected the Attorney General to place some evidence of the existing proceedings and make propositions of what that meant as regards the proceedings at hand. That was because if it was demonstrated that the company or its members and officials could have been involved in criminal activities relating to the debts in Kenya and that the foreign proceedings were simply an auxiliary to that scheme then it would be against public policy to recognize the foreign proceedings. However, nothing substantial had been placed before the court in evidence or arguments as to warrant drawing such a drastic conclusion.

Application partly allowed; each party to this process to bear their own costs.
Orders

  1. The court allowed the notice of motion of December 4, 2019 in terms of; prayer (2)which sought the court to recognize the proceedings in the Italian Court; prayer (3)which sought the court to recognize the decree of the Italian Court issued on July 12, 2019 granting the application filed by the company; prayer (7)which sought a stay and or issuance of an injunction barring any and all adverse actions, operation of any orders and decrees issued against the company and its subsidiaries and or branches pending the hearing and determination of the foreign proceedings in the Italian Court; and prayer (8)which sought a stay and or issuance of an injunction barring the commencement in any of the courts in the Republic of Kenya any civil proceedings of any type against the company and its subsidiaries and or branches pending the finalization of the voluntary arrangement underway in Italy under the direction of the proceedings in the Italian Court on condition that:-
  2. the relief did not affect any debt which was secured.
  3. No assets of whatever kind belonging to the company would be permitted to leave, be transferred out or encumbered or otherwise disposed of without the leave of the court.
  4. The judicial commissioners were to adopt such process that would give the Kenyan creditors meaningful and affordable access (including but limited to virtual access) and participation in the process of voluntary administration.
  5. Any creditor who would be dissatisfied with the pace of process or any other aspect of the process was at liberty to apply to the court for modification or termination of the relief.
  6. The court retained supervisory jurisdiction over the process and in the event of a dispute, any affected persons had a right to approach the court for relief.
  7. As a matter of public interest, any creditor was granted liberty to move the court with evidence that the company was not eligible to moratorium under the provisions of Part IX Division 2 of the Insolvency Act. Such application was to be filed within 30 days hereof.