The Decision by the National Executive to Deliver the Notice of Withdrawal of South Africa from the Rome Statute of the ICC without Prior Parliamentary Approval was Unconstitutional and Invalid.

Democratic Alliance vMinister of International Relations and Cooperation & 10 Others

High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)

Case No: 83145/2016

Mojapelo DJP, Makgoka and Mothle JJ

February 22, 2017

Reported by Linda Awuor & Faith Wanjiku

Download the Decision

Constitutional Law–International agreements-parliamentary approval to withdraw–whether the power of the national executive to negotiate and sign an international treaty included the power to withdraw from such treaty without prior parliamentary approval–The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, section 231

Constitutional Law-Bill of Rights-rights-whether the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by the national executive was substantively irrational thus breaching the State’s obligations under section 7(2) of the Constitution-The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, section 7(2)

International Law-Law of Treaty- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-withdrawal and notice of withdrawal- -whether thenational executive could deliver to the United Nations a notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court without seeking prior parliamentary approval -Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 127(1)

Brief Facts

On October 19, 2016, the national executive took a decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). Pursuant thereto and on the same day, the Minister of International Relations signed a notice of withdrawal to give effect to that decision and deposited it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That triggered the process for South Africa’s withdrawal. Under article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, the withdrawal of a party state from the Rome Statute took effect 12 months after the depositing of a notice to that effect. Thus, South Africa would cease to be state party to the statute in October 2017.

The reasons for withdrawal were that South Africa was faced with the conflicting obligation to arrest President Al Bashir under the Rome Statute, the obligation to the AU to grant immunity in terms of the Host Agreement, the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity of 1965 as well as the obligation under customary international law which recognised the immunity of sitting heads of state. Since South Africa found itself compelled to act, it had to do so, even under circumstances where it was actively involved in promoting peace, stability and dialogue in those countries.

On October 20 and 21, 2016 respectively, the Minister of Justice wrote identical letters to both the Speaker of the National Assembly (the 4th respondent) and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (the 5th respondent) advising them of cabinet’s decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, and the reasons therefore. In those letters, the Minister also stated his intention to table in parliament, a bill repealing the Implementation of the Rome of Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (Implementation Act) which was the domestic law giving effect to the Rome Statute in South Africa.

The Applicant launched an application in the Court seeking orders declaring unconstitutional and invalid: the notice of withdrawal and the underlying cabinet decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute and delivery of the notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, initiating the withdrawal. The Applicant also sought an order that the first, second and third respondents be directed to revoke the notice of withdrawal and take reasonable steps to terminate the process of withdrawal under article 127(1) of the Rome Statute.

Issues

 i. Whether the national executive‘s power to conclude international treaties, also included the power to give notice of withdrawal from international treaties without parliamentary approval under section 231 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Constitution).

ii.Whether it was constitutionally permissible for the national executive to deliver a notice of withdrawal from an international treaty without firstrepealing the domestic law giving effect to such treaty.

iii.Whether the notice of withdrawal in relation to the repeal of the Implementation Act was procedurally rational under section 231 of the Constitution.

iv. Whether the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by the national executive was substantively irrational thus breaching the State’s obligations under section 7(2) of the Constitution.

v. Whether a process of public participation in parliament should have preceded the lodging of the notice of withdrawal.

Relevant Provisions of the Law

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

Chapter 2-Bill of Rights

Section 7 (2)-Rights

The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.

Chapter 14-General Provisions (International Law)

Section 231-International agreements

(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.

(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).

(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.

(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.

(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998

Article 127 (1)-Withdrawal

A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

Held

  1. Under section 231(1) of the Constitution, the power to conduct international relations and to conclude treaties had been constitutionally conferred upon the national executive. That power was fettered by sections 231(2) and (4), which enjoined the national executive to engage parliament. The section therefore clearly delineated the powers between the national executive and parliament. Thus, once parliament approved the agreement, internationally the country became bound by that agreement. Domestically, the process was completed by parliament enacting such international agreement as national law in terms of section 231(4).
  2. The exercise of all public power, including the conducting of international relations, had to accord with the Constitution. South Africa had, in terms of section 231 of the Constitution, ratifiedboth the Rome Statute and domesticated it through the Implementation Act. While the notice of withdrawal was signed and delivered in the conduct of international relations and treaty-making as an executive act, it still remained an exercise in public power, which had to comply with the principle of legality and was subject to constitutional control. Equally, it was the responsibility of parliament to make laws. When making laws parliament could exercise its judgment as to the appropriate policy to address the situation. The formulation of policy to withdraw from the Rome Statute therefore no doubt fell exclusively within the national executive’s province. In the case, the declaratory statement which accompanied the notice of withdrawal reflected the national executive’s policy position.
  3. A notice of withdrawal, on a proper construction of section 231of the Constitution, was the equivalent of ratification, which required prior parliamentary approval in terms of section 231(2). The act of signing a treaty and the act of delivering a notice of withdrawal were different in their effect. The former had no direct legal consequences while by contrast, the delivery of a notice of withdrawal had concrete legal effects in international law, as it terminated treaty obligations, albeit on a deferred basis in the case. The argumentalso overlooked the explicit provisions of article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, which provided that a state could withdraw by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN. The notice of withdrawal deposited by the Minister of International Relations was the written notification envisaged in the article. Although the withdrawal would not take effect until a year, that notice constituted, at international level, a binding, unconditional and final decision of withdrawal from the Rome Statute.
  4. It was indeed correct that in international law, a notice of withdrawal from an international agreement did not require parliamentary approval. However the question of which between the national executive and parliament had to decide on withdrawal had to be settled according to domestic law. It was a domestic issue in which international law did not and could not prescribe. Prior parliamentary approval was required before instruments of ratification could be deposited with the UN. From that perspective, there was a glaring difficulty in accepting that the reverse process of withdrawal should not have been subject to the same parliamentary process. The necessary inference from section 231 was that parliament retained the power to determine whether to remain bound to an international treaty. That was necessary to give expression to the clear separation of powers between the national executive and the legislature embodied in the section. If it was parliament which determined whether an international agreement bound the country, it was constitutionally untenable that the national executive could unilaterally terminate such an agreement.
  5. The approval of an international agreement in terms of section 231(2) created a social contract between the people of South Africa, through their elected representatives in the legislature, and the national executive. That social contract gave rise to the rights and obligations expressed in such international agreement. The anomaly that the national executive could, without first seeking the approval of the people of South Africa, terminate those rights and obligations, was self-evident and manifest.
  6. It was trite that where a constitutional or statutory provision conferred a power to do something, that provision necessarily conferred the power to undo it as well. In the context of the case, the power to bind the country to the Rome Statute was expressly conferred on parliament. It had to therefore, perforce, be parliament which had the power to decide whether an international agreement ceased to bind the country. The conclusion was therefore that, on a textual construction of section 231(2)of the Constitution, South Africa could withdraw from the Rome Statute only on approval of parliament and after the repeal of the Implementation Act. That interpretation of the section was the most constitutionally compliant, giving effect to the doctrine of separation of powers so clearly delineated in section 231. The fact that that section did not expressly state that only parliament had the power to decide the withdrawal from the Rome Statute, was no bar to the interpretation.
  7. The matter was argued largely on the basis that there was no provision in the Constitution or in any other legislation for withdrawal from international treaties. There was probably a good reason why the Constitution provided for the power of the executive to negotiate and conclude international agreements but was silent on the power to terminate them. The reason was that as the executing arm of the state, the national executive needed authority to act. That authority could have flowed from the Constitution or from an Act of parliament. The national executive could exercise only those powers and perform those functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, or by law which was consistent with the Constitution. That was a basic requirement of the principle of legality and the rule of law. The absence of a provision in the Constitution or any other legislation of a power for the executive to terminate international agreements was therefore confirmation of the fact that such power did not exist unless and until parliament legislated for it. It was not a lacuna or omission.
  8. It would have been unwise if the Constitution had given power to the executive to terminate international agreements, and thus terminate existing rights and obligations, without first having obtained the authority of parliament. That would have conferred legislative powers on the executive, a clear breach of the separation of powers and the rule of law. On that basis, too, the national executive thus did not have and was never intended to have the power to terminate existing international agreements without prior approval of parliament. The national executive’s decision to deliver the notice of withdrawal without obtaining prior parliamentary approval violated section 231(2) of the Constitution, and breached the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in that section.
  9. Public participation was a parliamentary process in legislation-making. Parliament had a broad discretion in that regard, so long as it acted reasonably in terms of the prescripts of the Constitution. In respect of the repeal bill, which was already before it, parliament would determine how best to handle it, including whether it was necessary to hold public hearings or call for written submissions from the public. The finding that parliamentary approval of the notice of withdrawal and the repeal of the Implementation Act were required before a notice of withdrawal was delivered to the UN rendered it unnecessary to consider in any detail, whether public participation had been frustrated. That was so because, properly construed, the complaint that public participation had been hamstrung or circumvented by not seeking prior parliamentary approval was premised on the Court finding that the national executive had validly delivered the notice of withdrawal.
  10. The requirement for rationality was that government action had to be rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose. The principle of legality required that both the process by which the decision was made and the decision itself had to be rational. In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court explained that to determine procedural irrationality was to look at the process as a whole and determine whether steps in the process were rationally related to the end sought to be achieved. If not, whether the absence of a connection between a particular step was so unrelated to the end as to taint the whole process with irrationality. In the case, the procedural irrationality lay in the finding that the national executive did not consult parliament, as it was obliged to, before delivering the notice of withdrawal.
  11. Section 57(1) (a) of the Constitution provided that the National Assembly could determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures. Section 70(1) (a) gave similar powers to the National Council of Provinces. Parliament was therefore the master of its own processes, and the national executive was not entitled to dictate time frames to it within which to consider any bill before it. Parliament had a very special role to play in the constitutional democracy as it was the principal legislative organ of the state. With due regard to that role, it had to be free to carry out its functions without interference. Parliament should therefore not have been dictated to by the national executive to rush through the repeal bill in order to meet the national executive-created deadlines. There was prematurity and procedural irrationality in the lodging of the notice of withdrawal by the national executive without first consulting parliament. That unexplained haste itself constituted procedural irrationality.
  12. The Court debated on whether it was necessary to consider the substantive grounds of review, namely, substantive irrationality and the violation of the state’s obligations under section 7(2) of the Constitution. The said section provided that the state had to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Since there was a parliamentary process pending, it had to be assumed that parliament would comply with its constitutional obligation in that regard, for example, to facilitate public participation, which was its own process, and not of the executive. Any legislation which had potential impact on the bill of rights passed without such participation could be susceptible to a constitutional challenge against parliament. That challenge would not lie to the Court, as the Constitutional Court had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine a constitutional challenge based on alleged failure by the legislature to facilitate public involvement in its legislative and other processes as envisaged in section 59(1)(a) of the Constitution. It would be institutionally inappropriate for a court to intervene in the process of law-making on the assumption that parliament would not observe its constitutional obligations. The Court thus refrained from expressing any view on the substantive grounds.

Application upheld.

a)    The notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed by the first respondent, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on October 19, 2016, without prior parliamentary approval, was unconstitutional and invalid;

b)    The cabinet decision to deliver the notice of withdrawal to the United Nations Secretary-General without prior parliamentary approval, was unconstitutional and invalid;

c)    The first, second and third respondents – the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and the President of the Republic of South Africa, were ordered to forthwith revoke the notice of withdrawal referred in paragraph (a) above.

Relevance to the Kenyan Situation

Kenya is also a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. The Constitution of Kenya, article 2(6) provides that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution. There is also the Treaty Making and Ratification Act No. 45 of 2012 which gives effect to article 2(6) of the Constitution and provides for the procedure of treaty making and ratification. Section 4 (1) provides that the national executive shall be responsible for initiating the treaty making process, negotiating and ratifying treaties. Section 5 (1) provides that the national executive shall initiate the treaty making process in a manner prescribed by the Cabinet Secretary. Section 8 (1) goes on to state that where the Cabinet approves the ratification of a treaty, the Cabinet Secretary shall submit the treaty and a memorandum on the treaty to the Speaker of the National Assembly which may then approve the ratification of a treaty with or without reservations.

Section 17 provides for withdrawal from a treaty and that the relevant Cabinet Secretary shall prepare a cabinet memorandum indicating the reasons for such an intention. The provisions of sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act shall apply with necessary modifications, to withdrawal from a treaty.

Kenya in the year 2013 started to actualize its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Government secured a mandate from Parliament to withdraw. Parliament’s motions calling for the Government to pull out of the ICC were passed on September 5 and 10, 2013, a time when the ICC was pursuing charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto. The reasons for the withdrawal included that the ICC was insensitive to the need for countries to stabilize politically and move forward peacefully. Another was that Kenya had conducted its general elections at which the President and Deputy President were lawfully elected. However the processes for withdrawal are yet to begin.

The South African case will be an important precedent to Kenya, also a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in emphasizing the need to follow the correct procedural and substantial process when a state party wishes to withdraw from a treaty, specially the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court.