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1. The plain purpose of the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 was to protect agencies from having to pay costs that were the legal responsibility of an animal’s owner. What the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 did was to provide a way to implement the legal principle that, despite the impoundment, the obligation to provide adequate care for the animals remained the owner’s, not the government’s. A forfeiture resulted only if the owner could not fulfill that preexisting obligation (by paying a security deposit or posting a bond) to enable the state mitigate costs while ensuring that the animals received the care that was legally required—costs that, prior to the enactment of the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347, agencies had struggled to recover.
2. By requiring animal owners to pay a security deposit or post a bond for the care of their animals, and by authorizing the forfeiture of animals when their owners did not pay for that care, the statute thereby prevented the unjust enrichment of the owners while ensuring that the animals would receive the care that was legally required. Thus, the nature of the relief requested in a proceeding brought under the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 was equitable, in that the statute helped ensure that animal care agencies were not required to cover costs for care that animal owners had a legal obligation to pay.
3. The legislative history of the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 confirmed that the nature of the relief that the statute provided was protection against the transfer of animal owners’ costs to animal care agencies. Prior to the enactment of the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347, the legislature enacted the Oregon Administrative Rules § 87.159, which provided that, when an agency had provided care for an impounded animal, the agency had a lien on the animal for the reasonable costs of care of the animal and could retain the animal until the owner had paid the lien. But that statute did not protect agencies from incurring costs in the first instance, and, in some situations, those costs were not recoverable, such as when an owner did not want to reclaim the animal or when an owner was unable to pay the lien.
4. The limitations of using liens on animals to recover the costs of their care came to the attention of the legislature after one county incurred approximately $100,000 in costs caring for impounded animals pending resolution of an animal abuse case. The legislature enacted Senate Bill 653, codified as the Oregon Administrative Rules § 167.347 to provide an alternative method to protect agencies from suffering significant losses as a result of having to care for impounded animals. The Oregon Administrative Rules § 167.347 was not intended to provide financial gain; it was intended only to enable county animal shelters and other animal care agencies to avoid unnecessary expense.
5. The nature of the relief that the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 provided relief from having to pay ongoing costs for animal care when the animal’s owner was legally obligated to pay for that care was equitable, in that it protected against unjust enrichment of the owner. There was no court trial right in proceedings under statutes that required a person to reimburse the state for providing care that the person had a legal responsibility to provide. Those two indicators lead the court to the conclusion that a proceeding brought under the Oregon Administrative Rules § 167.347 did not involve a claim for relief that would have been tried to a court at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and, therefore, was not one to which the article I, section 17, of the Constitution of Oregon, 1857, regarding the court trial right applied.
6. Although a defendant’s failure to pay a security deposit or post a bond under the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 could result in forfeiture of the defendant’s animals, it was the property which was proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. The forfeiture procedure at issue was not an action in personam against some offending person but, rather, a special proceeding in rem against specific property because of some unlawful use having been made of it in violation of the state prohibition law.
7. The nature of the relief requested in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding was different than that sought in a proceeding brought under the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347, in that the relief sought in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding was not intended to prevent the inequitable shifting of legal obligations. Instead, it was intended to impose a consequence for past misconduct; an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding was similar to a criminal proceeding, in that, it was based on a legal fiction that the property had committed a crime.
8. An in rem civil forfeiture proceeding was quasi-criminal in character in that its object, like a criminal proceeding, was to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. In that way, an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding was markedly different from a proceeding brought under the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347, which was not intended to impose a consequence for past misconduct but was instead intended to prevent the inequitable shifting of legal obligations. The purpose of the Oregon Administrative Rules §167.347 was to enforce the owner’s obligation to care for the animals; the statute did not impose a penalty of any sort for any kind of misconduct.

 Since the society’s formation one hundred years ago, KSPCA [Kenya Society for the Protection and Care of Animals] has grown and is well known for animal rescue and rehabilitation. With a focus on domestic animals, KSPCA is currently home to around 150 dogs, 90 cats as well as donkeys and goats at any one time. We rehome around 45-50 dogs and 20 cats every month.

 …the donkey has been neglected and suffer diverse welfare issues including being overworked throughout the day without feed and failure to recognize care and protection by their owners… [there are] numerous cases involving the abuse of donkeys, poor husbandry practices and slaughtering for their meat has created a volatile environment for donkey care and survival across the country as well…Others even load luggage on injured backs of their donkeys and force them to push overloaded and heavy carts, while others assault by beating them harshly.

 (1) A person shall be guilty of an offence of cruelty if he—

 (2) For the purposes of this section an owner shall be deemed to have permitted the commission of an offence if he fails to exercise reasonable care and supervision in respect of the protection of the animal therefrom provided that, where an owner is convicted of permitting the commission of an offence by reason only of his having failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision, he shall not be liable to imprisonment without the option of a fine.

 (1) Whenever a person is charged with an offence under this Act or any regulation made thereunder in relation to an animal, a magistrate having jurisdiction in the area which the offence is alleged to have been committed may by order in writing authorize any person to seize that animal and to cause it to be removed to some place of custody, pending the hearing of the charge, if the magistrate is satisfied, from information given on oath, that such seizure and removal are necessary in order to prevent the animal being exposed to further damage, injury or unnecessary suffering.

 From the evidence of the appellant, there appears to have been a grudge between the appellant and the complainant over the destruction of a fence. It is most likely that the complainant saw an opportunity to “teach” the appellant a lesson when his dog was found dead near the fence of the appellant’s farm. All these factors raises reasonable doubt that PW4 infact saw the appellant kill the dog. Further the appellant offered an alibi defence which further supports his case that he was not present at home when the dog was killed. The alibi defence by the accused was not challenged by the prosecution on cross-examination.

 It is my finding therefore that the sentence was lawful. However, I have considered the circumstances of the case. Firstly, I observe that the Appellant was wrongly convicted for injuring five donkeys instead of three donkeys as earlier pointed out in this judgment. Secondly, there was evidence which showed that the complainants’ animals had repeatedly destroyed the Appellants’ crops which provoked him. While the Appellant cannot be excused for taking the law into his hands, I find these to be mitigating circumstances and that the sentence meted was harsh and excessive.