Munge v Invesco Company Limited (Insolvency Cause E004 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 15982 (KLR) (Commercial and Tax) (25 November 2022) (Ruling)
Neutral citation:
[2022] KEHC 15982 (KLR)
Republic of Kenya
Insolvency Cause E004 of 2021
A Mabeya, J
November 25, 2022
Between
James Ndungu Munge
Petitioner
and
Invesco Company Limited
Respondent
Ruling
1.The matter for determination is the preliminary objection raised on 4/11/2021 by the debtor on the grounds that the statutory demand dated 12/6/2020 was fatally defective as it was in breach of section 77B (1) of the Insolvency Regulations 2018. That the petition be struck out as it was anchored in inapplicable provisions of the law and did not disclose a cause of action.
2.The preliminary objection was canvassed by way of written submissions.
3.The petitioner submitted that the decretal sum was not disputed as the respondent had even come up with a proposal to settle the same. Counsel further submitted that failing to conform to forms 32C, 32D and 32E would not invalidate a petition for insolvency of a company.
4.The respondent on the other hand submitted that the statutory demands issued by the petitioner were not in form 32E. That section 122 of the Insurance Act provided that the insurer’s inability to pay debts could not be anchored on section 384 of the Insolvency Act. It was the respondent’s submission that the petition did not disclose any reasonable cause of action.
5.I have considered the preliminary objection and the submissions by the parties. The issue for determination is whether the preliminary objection dated 4/11/2021 is merited.
6.The threshold for preliminary objections is that they should be purely based on a point of law.
7.In Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co Ltd –v- West End Distributors Limited (1969) EA 696, a preliminary objection per Law JA was stated to be: -
8.Sir Charles Newbold, P stated: -
9.In the present case, the preliminary objection was raised on the ground that the statutory demand dated 12/6/2020 was fatally defective and in breach of section 77b(1)of the Insolvency Act and for ailing to invoke sections 41 and 122 of the Insurance Act.
10.It is trite that a preliminary objection should be raised on a pure point of law with no contest as to the facts. In this case, the applicant challenges the law the petitioner invoked in the petition. In my opinion, incorrect provision goes to the jurisdiction of the court and thus raises a point of law.
11.The question therefore is whether invoking section 384 of the Insolvency Act as opposed to sections 41 and 122 of the Insurance Act was fatal to the petition.
12.Section 384 of the Insolvency Act provides: -
13.On the other hand, sections 41 and 122 of the Insurance Act provides: -
14.The foregoing provisions give the procedures for insolvency proceedings. While I appreciate that section 41 and 122 are more specific with regard to the insurance companies, my view is that the same cannot act as a bar to litigants invoking section 384 of the Insolvency Act in insolvency proceedings.
15.In Salesio Kinyua Njagi & 9 others v Invesco Assurance Company Limited [2021] eKLR, it was held: -
16.With regard to the defective statutory forms, I find that the same do not prejudice the respondent in the petition and the same can be cured as a procedural technicality under article 159 of the Constitution.
17.In the upshot, I find that the preliminary objection lacks merit and the same is dismissed with costs.
18It is so ordered.
DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2022.A. MABEYA, FCIArbJUDGE