a. The Principles of Constitutional Interpretation:
131.This issue will lay a solid basis for consideration of the rest of the issues.
132.The High Court in David Ndii & others v Attorney General & others [2021] eKLR (famous referred to as ‘the BBI case’) captured with precision the manner in which our transformative Constitution ought to be interpreted. The learned judges presented themselves thus: -
399.One of the imports of recognition of the nature of the transformative character of our Constitution is that it has informed our methods of constitutional interpretation. In particular, the following four constitutional interpretive principles have emerged from our jurisprudence:a)First, the Constitution must be interpreted holistically; only a structural holistic approach breathes life into the Constitution in the way it was intended by the framers. Hence, the Supreme Court has stated in In the Matter of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Supreme Court Advisory Opinion Reference No 1 of 2012; [2014] eKLR thus (at paragraph 26):But what is meant by a holistic interpretation of the Constitution? It must mean interpreting the Constitution in context. It is contextual analysis of a constitutional provision, reading it alongside and against other provisions, so as to maintain a rational explication of what the Constitution must be taken to mean in the light of its history, of the issues in dispute, and of the prevailing circumstances.b)Second, our transformative Constitution does not favour formalistic approaches to its interpretation. It must not be interpreted as one would a mere statute. The Supreme Court pronounced itself on this principle In re Interim Independent Election Commission [2011] eKLR, para [86] thus:The rules of constitutional interpretation do not favour formalistic or positivistic approaches (articles 20(4) and 259(1)). The Constitution has incorporated non-legal considerations, which we must take into account, in exercising our jurisdiction. The Constitution has a most modern Bill of Rights, that envisions a human rights based, and social-justice oriented State and society. The values and principles articulated in the preamble, in article 10, in chapter 6, and in various provisions, reflect historical, economic, social, cultural and political realities and aspirations that are critical in building a robust, patriotic and indigenous jurisprudence for Kenya. article 159(1) states that judicial authority is derived from the people. That authority must be reflected in the decisions made by the courts.c)Third, the Constitution has provided its own theory of interpretation to protect and preserve is values, objects and purposes. As the Retired CJ Mutunga expressed in his concurring opinion in In In Re the Speaker of the Senate & another v Attorney General & 4 others, Supreme Court Advisory Opinion No 2 of 2013; [2013] eKLR. (paragraphs 155-157):
(155)In both my respective dissenting and concurring opinions, In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and Senate, Sup Ct Appl No 2 of 2012; and Jasbir Singh Rai& 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others Sup Ct Petition No 4 of 2012, I argued that both the Constitution, 2010 and the Supreme Court Act, 2011 provide comprehensive interpretative frameworks upon which fundamental hooks, pillars, and solid foundations for the interpreting our Constitution should be based. In both opinions, I provided the interpretative coordinates that should guide our jurisprudential journey, as we identify the core provisions of our Constitution, understand its content, and determine its intended effect.
(156)The Supreme Court of Kenya, in the exercise of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, has a solemn duty and a clear obligation to provide firm and recognizable reference-points that the lower courts and other institutions can rely on, when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution. Each matter that comes before the court must be seized upon as an opportunity to provide high-yielding interpretative guidance on the Constitution; and this must be done in a manner that advances its purposes, gives effect to its intents, and illuminates its contents. The court must also remain conscious of the fact that constitution-making requires compromise, which can occasionally lead to contradictions; and that the political and social demands of compromise that mark constitutional moments, fertilize vagueness in phraseology and draftsmanship. It is to the courts that the country turns, in order to resolve these contradictions; clarify draftsmanship gaps; and settle constitutional disputes. In other words, constitution making does not end with its promulgation; it continues with its interpretation. It is the duty of the court to illuminate legal penumbras that Constitution borne out of long drawn compromises, such as ours, tend to create. The constitutional text and letter may not properly express the minds of the framers, and the minds and hands of the framers may also fail to properly mine the aspirations of the people. It is in this context that the spirit of the Constitution has to be invoked by the court as the searchlight for the illumination and elimination of these legal penumbras.d)Fourthly, in interpreting the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, non-legal considerations are important to give its true meaning and values. The Supreme Court expounded about the incorporation of the non-legal considerations and their importance in constitutional interpretation in the Communications Commission of Kenya case. It stated thus:
(356)We revisit once again the critical theory of constitutional-interpretation and relate it to the emerging human rights jurisprudence based on chapter four – The Bill of Rights – of our Constitution. The fundamental right in question in this case is the freedom and the independence of the media. We have taken this opportunity to illustrate how historical, economic, social, cultural, and political content is fundamentally critical in discerning the various provisions of the Constitution that pronounce on its theory of interpretation. A brief narrative of the historical, economic, social, cultural, and political background to articles 4(2), 33, 34, and 35 of our Constitution has been given above in paragraphs 145-163.(357)We begin with the concurring opinion of the CJ and President in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others, Supreme Court Petition No 2B of 2014 left off (see paragraphs 227- 232). In paragraphs 232 and 233 he stated thus:
(232)…References to Black’s Law Dictionary will not, therefore, always be enough, and references to foreign cases will have to take into account these peculiar Kenyan needs and contexts.
(233)It is possible to set out the ingredients of the theory of the interpretation of Constitution: the theory is derived from Constitution through conceptions that my dissenting and concurring opinions have signalled, as examples of interpretative coordinates; it is also derived from the provisions of section 3 of the Supreme Court Act, that introduce non-legal phenomena into the interpretation of Constitution, so as to enrich the jurisprudence evolved while interpreting all its provisions; and the strands emerging from the various chapters also crystallize this theory. Ultimately, therefore, this court as the custodian of the norm of Constitution has to oversee the coherence, certainty, harmony, predictability, uniformity, and stability of various interpretative frameworks dully authorized. The overall objective of the interpretative theory, in the terms of the Supreme Court Act, is to “facilitate the social, economic and political growth” of Kenya.
400.With these interpretive principles in mind, which we will call the canon of constitutional interpretation principles to our transformative Constitution, we will presently return to the transcendental question posed in these consolidated petitions…...
133.With such a background, a consideration of the next issue follows.b.Whether regulations 18(2)(c), 24(2)(c), 28(2)(c) and 36(2)(c) of the Elections (General) Regulations, 2012 (as amended in 2017) contravene articles 2(4), 10, 27, 38(3), 83(3), 99, 137 and 193 of the Constitution:
134.The parties’ cases and submissions on this issue have been well captured in the foregoing part of this judgment.
135.However, for ease of reference in this discussion, I will reproduce verbatim regulations 18, 24, 28 and 36 of the Elections (General) Regulations, 2012 (an amended in 2017) hereinbelow: -Regulation 18:18. Supporters of nomination of presidential candidate and statutory declaration:(1)The person delivering an application for nomination under regulation 16 or 17 shall at least five days to the day fixed for nomination, deliver to the commission a list bearing the names, respective signatures, identity card or passport numbers of at least two thousand voters registered in each of a majority of the counties, in standard A4 sheets of paper and in an electronic form.(2)The sheets of paper delivered under this regulation shall—(a)be serially numbered;(b)each have at the top, in typescript, the wording at the top of Form 12; and(c)be accompanied by copies of the identification document of the voters referred to in sub-regulation (1).(3)There shall be delivered to the returning officer together with the application for nomination, a statutory declaration in Form 13 set out in the schedule, made not earlier than one month before the nomination day.Regulations 24:(1)1) The person delivering an application for nomination under regulation 23 shall at the same time deliver to the returning officer for each elective post, standard A4 sheets of paper bearing the names, respective signatures and voter’s number of at least one thousand voters registered in the constituency or county, as the case may be.(2)The sheets of paper delivered under sub regulation (3) shall—(a)be serially numbered;b.each have at the top, in typescript, the wording at the top of Form 15;(c)be accompanied by copies of the voters cards of the voters referred to in sub regulation (3).Regulations 28:(1)The person delivering an application for nomination under regulation 27 shall at the same time deliver to the returning officer, standard A4 sheets of paper bearing the names, respective signatures and electoral numbers of two thousand registered voters in the county.(2)The sheets of paper delivered under sub regulation (4) shall—(a)be serially numbered;(b)each have at the top, in typescript, the wording at the top of in Form 16; and(c)be accompanied by copies of the voters cards of the voters referred to in sub regulation (3).Regulations 36:(1)The person delivering a nomination application under regulation 35 shall at the same time deliver to the returning officer, standard A4 sheets of paper bearing the names, respective signatures and electoral numbers of five hundred voters registered in the ward.(2)The sheets of paper delivered under sub regulation (3) shall—(a)be serially numbered;(b)each have at the top, in typescript, the wording in Form 18; and
136.The consolidated petitions challenge the impugned regulations.
137.The impugned regulations revolve around political rights. Those rights are provided for under article 38 of the Constitution. The said article cements the fundamental freedom to make political choices as follows: -
38.Political rights:
(1)Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right—(a)to form, or participate in forming, a political party;(b)to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; or(c)to campaign for a political party or cause.(2)Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections based on universal suffrage and the free expression of the will of the electors for—(a)any elective public body or office established under this Constitution; or(b)any office of any political party of which the citizen is a member.(3)Every adult citizen has the right, without unreasonable restrictions—(a)to be registered as a voter;(b)to vote by secret ballot in any election or referendum; and(c)to be a candidate for public office, or office within a political party of which the citizen is a member and, if elected, to hold office.
138.In the context of the consolidated petitions herein, the freedom to make political choices is allegedly impugned as against persons standing in elections as independent candidates.
139.The eligibility to stand as an independent candidate is provide for in article 85 of the Constitution, and as follows: -
85.Any person is eligible to stand as an independent candidate for election if the person: -a.is not a member of a registered political party and has not been a member for at least three months immediately before the date of the election; and(b)satisfies the requirements of: -i.Article 99(1)(c)(i) or (ii), in the case of a candidate for election to the National Assembly or the Senate, respectively; orii.Article 193(1)(c)(ii), in the case of a candidate for election to a county assembly
140.Articles 99 and 193 of the Constitution further provides for the eligibility requirements. The relevant requirements in respect to the consolidated Petitions herein are article 99(1)(c) and article 193(1)(c)(ii) of the Constitution which provide as under: -Article 99(1)(c):(c)is nominated by a political party, or is an independent candidate who is supported: -i.in the case of election to the National Assembly, by at least one thousand registered voters in the constituency; or(ii)in the case of election to the Senate, by at least two thousand registered voters in the county.Article 193(1)(c)(ii):2.is either—i.…….(ii)an independent candidate supported by at least five hundred registered voters in the ward concerned.
141.Article 82 of the Constitution commands Parliament to enact legislation to provide for elections. Among the legislation which Parliament has since enacted is the one on nomination of candidates. Further, under article 88, the Constitution vests the duty to register candidates for elections on the IEBC.
142.One of the legislations passed by Parliament pursuant to article 82 of the Constitution is the Elections Act, No 24 of 2011.
143.In section 109, the Elections Act allows the IEBC to make regulations for the better carrying out of the purposes and provisions of the Act In 2012, the IEBC came up with the Elections (General) Regulations, 2012. These Regulations have since been amended through Legal Notice No 72 of 2017.
145.Deriving from the cannons of interpretation of our transformative Constitution, it comes to the fore that the constitutional design in respect to political rights is to favour a permissive approach as opposed to a restrictive one. Therefore, it is the intent of the Constitution that as many as those willing to take part in elections are not unreasonably hindered.
146.This court will, therefore, weigh the impugned regulations against the said constitutional parameter.
147.In doing so, it becomes imperative that I look at the aspect of voter registration in Kenya.
148.The registration of voters is provided for in article 83 of the Constitution as follows: -(1)A person qualifies for registration as a voter at elections or referenda if the person—(a)is an adult citizen;(b)is not declared to be of unsound mind; and(c)has not been convicted of an election offence during the preceding five years.(2)A citizen who qualifies for registration as a voter shall be registered at only one registration centre.(3)Administrative arrangements for the registration of voters and the conduct of elections shall be designed to facilitate, and shall not deny, an eligible citizen the right to vote or stand for election.
149.Article 260 of the Constitution defines an ‘adult’ as an individual who has attained the age of eighteen years.
150.Whereas the the Constitution does not define who a voter is, section 2 of the Elections Act defines such a "voter" to mean a person whose name is included in a current register of voters.
151.The Elections Act provide for continuous registration of voters save for the instances captured in section 5 thereof.
152.In section 5(3), the Elections Act provides the manner in which one may be registered as a voter. It states as under: -Any citizen of Kenya who has attained the age of eighteen years as evidenced by either a national identity card or a Kenyan passport and whose name is not in the register of voters shall be registered as a voter upon application, in the prescribed manner, to the Commission.
154.Regulation 13 deals with new registration as follows: -a.A person who desires to be registered as a voter shall make an application in Form A set out in the schedule.(2)An application under sub regulation (1) shall be made to the registration officer for the constituency in which the person wishes to be registered.(3)The registration officer shall collect biometric data of persons applying for registration.
155.The procedure for application to be registered as a voter is in regulation 13A; which provides as follows: -(1)A person who applies to be registered as a voter shall present his or her identification document to the registration officer stationed at a registration centre of his or her choice.(2)The registration officer shall, where the applicant is qualified to be registered as a voter, issue the applicant with Form A as set out in the schedule.(3)The applicant shall return the duly completed Form A to the registration officer and the registration officer shall confirm the details in the form and enter them in the biometric voter registration system and the Voters Record Book.(4)The applicant shall be issued with an acknowledgement slip upon registration.
156.I have also perused the Form A in the schedule of the Registration Regulations. It requires the applicant to declare that one is qualified to be, and not disqualified from being, registered as a voter under the law in respect of the classes of election for which the person applies for registration and that he/she is in possession of a National Identity Card or Kenyan passport with the number indicated in the application.
157.As said, it is at the registration stage of a voter where the person’s biometric data is also collected.
158.It is, therefore, the position that once a person is registered as a voter, the IEBC retains the personal details of the voter including the details of the National Identity Card or Kenyan passport used in the registration. The name of such a person is also entered into the Register of Voters.
159.A duly registered voter will be eligible to vote in an election. It is also only a registered voter who is eligible to stand for an election under articles 99(1)(c) and 193(1)(c)(ii) of the Constitution.
160.It is further a registered voter who is called upon to comply with the impugned regulations at a time when one seeks to be registered as an independent candidate in an election.
161.Having run through the background of the impugned regulations, the question that now begs for an answer is whether a registered voter who seeks to stand in any election as an independent candidate should still provide copies of the national identity cards of his/her supporters further to the sheets of paper bearing the names, respective signatures and the numbers of the identification documents which the registered voters used during registration as voters.
162.The question, hence, takes us back to article 38 of the Constitution on political rights which vouches for the freedom to make political choices and the need not to place any unreasonable restrictions in order to attain such rights.
163.However, before the question is answered, it is imperative to have a look at how the Commission has previously conducted elections and referenda in light of the impugned regulations.
164.The impugned regulations were enacted pursuant to an amendment to the Elections (General) Regulations, 2012. The amendment was vide the Elections (General) (Amendment) Regulations, 20I7 under Legal Notice No. 72 of 2017. The amendments were to come into operation upon publication in the Gazette. The publication was on the April 24, 2017 under Special Issue of the Kenya Gazette Supplement No 65.
165.Given that the passage of the amendments was just a few months to the last general election which was held in August 2017, the Commission did not enforce the impugned regulations. The Commission is, therefore, enforcing the impugned regulations for the first time in this year’s General election.
166.That being the case, the Commission, therefore, conducted the last two general elections under the 2010 Constitution without calling for copies of identification documents for any of the independent candidates who stood in those elections.
167.There has also been attempts to amend the Constitution since its promulgation in 2010. One of such attempts was the famous ‘Punguza Mzigo Bill’. The proposed amendment was by way of popular initiative under article 257 of the Constitution. Article 257(1) of the Constitution provides that a proposal by popular initiative must be signed by at least one million registered voters.
168.The proposers of the amendments collected the requisite number of signatures of the registered voters and delivered them to the Commission. The Commission verified them and confirmed that the signatures had attained the threshold of one million registered voters and allowed the other processes to follow. In this instance, there was no requirement for the supply of copies of the identification documents of the supporters of the amendment. The amendment did not, however, see the light of the day.
169.There was also another equally famous attempt to amend the Constitution vide the ‘Building Bridges Initiative’ which also known as ‘the BBI’. Again, the requisite number of signatures of the registered voters who supported the BBI were collected and delivered to the Commission. The Commission verified them and confirmed that the signatures had attained the threshold of one million registered voters and allowed the other processes to follow.
170.Just like in the case of the Punguza Mzigo Initiative, there was no requirement for the supply of copies of the identification documents of the supporters of the amendment in the BBI. This initiative did not also come to pass.
171.At this point in time, it behooves us take note of the fact that the Constitution does not place any duty upon the proposers of any amendment to Constitution under the popular initiative to supply of copies of the identification documents of the supporters of the amendment. The Constitution only calls for the signatures of the supporters who are registered voters.
172.There is no doubt that an amendment to the Constitution is, by any means, is on a higher pedestal than the registration of an independent candidate to stand for an election. Surprisingly, an amendment to the Constitution does not call for supply of copies of the identification documents of the supporters of the amendment, but the registration of independent candidates to stand for elections does.
173.The impugned regulations have been challenged on various grounds. One of them was that regulations were unnecessary and served no meaningful purpose.
174.I believe the foregoing comparison between how the Constitution may be amended by way of popular initiative and the requirement to supply of copies of the identification documents of the supporters of of independent candidates to stand for elections answers this challenge.
175.In other words, if the signatures of registered voters are capable of proving that a constitutional amendment is supported by such persons then, likewise, the signatures of registered voters are capable of proving that an independent candidate is supported by a certain number of registered voters.
176.Further persuasion can be discerned from other relevant legislations which do not make a mandatory requirement for the supply of copies of identification documents, but only identification particulars. For instance, section 7(2)(f)(i) of the Political Parties Act provides for the conditions of full registration of a political party upon submission to the Registrar of Political Parties a list of the names, addresses and identification particulars of all its members.
177.There is also the Political Parties (Membership) Regulations, 2021 which do not require a political party to retain copies of identification documents of its members, but only the identification particulars and the application for registration forms. The regulations in defining the “Integrated Political Parties Information Management System", “membership list and the “register” makes specific reference to members’ particulars and do not require copies of any identification documents.
178.The Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition at page 1294 defines the word ‘particulars’ to mean ‘the specific facts about a person’s background.’
179.The Cambridge Dictionary University Press defines the term ‘particulars’ to mean ‘details or information about a person or an event.’
180.It is also of importance to note that even the functions of the Registrar of Political Parties under section 34 of the Political Parties Act only requires the Registrar to maintain a Register of members of political parties containing members’ particulars and not copies of identification documents.
181.A common thread running across the foregoing legislative provisions and definitions is the requirement for particulars of the identification documents and not for copies of the said documents. Had the drafters of the legislation intended copies of the identification documents nothing would have been easier to expressly provide for such.
182.Flowing from the above, it is apparent that the impugned regulations do not serve any meaningful purpose other than placing an unreasonable burden on the independent candidates.
183.Another challenge to the impugned regulation was on whether the impugned regulations were subjected to public participation, stakeholder consultations and administratively fair procedures.
185.The analysis was as follows: -
115.The starting point is the Constitution. Article 2 inter alia declares Constitution as the supreme law of the land which binds all persons and all State organs at both levels of government. It also provides that the validity or legality of the Constitution is not subject to any kind of challenge and that any law that is inconsistent with it is void to the extent of that inconsistency. Further, any act or omission in contravention of the Constitution is invalid. Article 3 places an obligation upon every person to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution.
116.Article 10 provides for the national values and principles of governance which bind all state organs, state officers, public officers and all persons whenever any of them applies or interprets the Constitution, enacts, applies or interprets any law or makes or implements any public policy decisions.
117.The Constitution also provided for alignment of the laws then in force at its promulgation. Section 7(1) of the sixth schedule states as follows: -Any law in force immediately before the effective date continues in force and shall be construed with the alterations, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary to bring it into conformity with this Constitution.
118.Expounding on article 10 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others, Civil Appeal No 224 of 2017; [2017] eKLR held that:In our view, analysis of the jurisprudence from the Supreme Court leads us to the clear conclusion that article 10(2) of the Constitution is justiciable and enforceable immediately. For avoidance of doubt, we find and hold that the values espoused in article 10(2) are neither aspirational nor progressive; they are immediate, enforceable and justiciable. The values are not directive principles. Kenyans did not promulgate the 2010 Constitution in order to have devolution, good governance, democracy, rule of law and participation of the people to be realized in a progressive manner in some time in the future; it could never have been the intention of Kenyans to have good governance, transparency and accountability to be realized and enforced gradually. Likewise, the values of human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness and non-discrimination cannot be aspirational and incremental, but are justiciable and immediately enforceable. Our view on this matter is reinforced by article 259(1)(a) which enjoins all persons to interpret the Constitution in a manner that promotes its values and principles.Consequently, in this appeal, we make a firm determination that article 10(2) of the Constitution is justiciable and enforceable and violation of the article can found a cause of action either on its own or in conjunction with other constitutional articles or statutes as appropriate.
119.Courts have also dealt with the concepts of public participation and stakeholders’ consultation or engagement. The High Court in Robert N Gakuru & others v Governor Kiambu County & 3 others [2014] eKLR while referring to the South African decision in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & others (CCT12/05) [2006] ZACC 11; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (cc); 2006(6) SA 416 (CC) adopted the following definition of public participation: -According to their plain and ordinary meaning, the words public involvement or public participation refers to the process by which the public participates in something. Facilitation of public involvement in the legislative process, therefore, means taking steps to ensure that the public participate in the legislative process.
120.Public participation therefore refers to the processes of engaging the public or a representative sector while developing laws and formulating policies that affect them. The processes may take different forms. At times it may include consultations. The Black’s Law Dictionary 10th Edition defines ‘consultation’ as follows: -The act of asking the advice or opinion of someone. A meeting in which parties consult or confer.
121.Consultation is, hence, a more robust and pointed approach towards involving a target group. It is often referred to as stakeholders’ engagement. Speaking on consultation the Court of Appeal in Legal Advice Centre & 2 others v County Government of Mombasa & 4 others [2018] eKLR quoted with approval Ngcobo J in Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (2) (CCT73/05A) [2006] ZACC 12; 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC) as follows: -……The more discrete and identifiable the potentially affected section of the population, and the more intense the possible effect on their interests, the more reasonable it would be to expect the legislature to be astute to ensure that the potentially affected section of the population is given a reasonable opportunity to have a say….
122.In a Three-Judge bench the High Court in consolidated Constitutional Petition Nos 305 of 2012, 34 of 2013 and 12 of 2014 (Formerly Nairobi Constitutional Petition 43 of 2014) Mui Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 17 others [2015] eKLR the court addressed the concept of consultation in the following manner: -…. A public participation programme, must…show intentional inclusivity and diversity. Any clear and intentional attempts to keep out bona fide stakeholders would render the public participation programme ineffective and illegal by definition. In determining inclusivity in the design of a public participation regime, the government agency or Public Official must take into account the subsidiarity principle: those most affected by a policy, legislation or action must have a bigger say in that policy, legislation or action and their views must be more deliberately sought and taken into account.(emphasis added)
123.Consultation or stakeholders’ engagement tends to give more latitude to key sector stakeholders in a given field to take part in the process towards making laws or formulation of administrative decisions which to a large extent impact on them. That is because such key stakeholders are mostly affected by the law, policy or decision in a profound way. Therefore, in appropriate instances a government agency or a public officer undertaking public participation may have to consider incorporating the aspect of consultation or stakeholders’ engagement.
124.The importance of public participation cannot be gainsaid. The Court of Appeal in Legal Advice Centre & 2 others v County Government of Mombasa & 4 others (supra) while dealing with the aspect of public participation in lawmaking process stated as followed: -The purpose of permitting public participation in the law-making process is to afford the public the opportunity to influence the decision of the law-makers. This requires the law-makers to consider the representations made and thereafter make an informed decision. Law-makers must provide opportunities for the public to be involved in meaningful ways, to listen to their concerns, values, and preferences, and to consider these in shaping their decisions and policies. Were it to be otherwise, the duty to facilitate public participation would have no meaning.
125.In Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (2) (CCT73/05A), the South African Constitutional Court stated as follows: -A commitment to a right to…public participation in governmental decision-making is derived not only from the belief that we improve the accuracy of decisions when we allow people to present their side of the story, but also from our sense that participation is necessary to preserve human dignity and selfrespect…
126.The South African Constitutional Court in Poverty Alleviation Network & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & 19 others, CCT 86/08 [2010] ZACC 5 discussed the importance of public participation as follows: -.…engagement with the public is essential. Public participation informs the public of what is to be expected. It allows for the community to express concerns, fears and even to make demands. In any democratic state, participation is integral to its legitimacy. When a decision is made without consulting the public the result can never be an informed decision.
127.Facilitation of public participation is key in ensuring legitimacy of the law, decision or policy reached. On the threshold of public participation, the Court of Appeal in Legal Advice Centre & 2 others v County Government of Mombasa & 4 others (supra) referred to Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 others [2017] eKLR stated as follows: -the mechanism used to facilitate public participation namely, through meetings, press conferences, briefing of members of public, structures questionnaires as well as a department dedicated to receiving concerns on the project, was adequate in the circumstances. We find so taking into account that the 1st respondent has the discretion to choose the medium it deems fit as long as it ensures the widest reach to the members of public and/or interested party.
128.In Mui Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 17 others (supra)the court enumerated the following practical principles in ascertaining whether a reasonable threshold was reached in facilitating public participation: -a.First, it is incumbent upon the government agency or public official involved to fashion a programme of public participation that accords with the nature of the subject matter. It is the government agency or Public Official who is to craft the modalities of public participation but in so doing the government agency or Public Official must take into account both the quantity and quality of the governed to participate in their own governance. Yet the government agency enjoys some considerable measure of discretion in fashioning those modalities.b.Second, public participation calls for innovation and malleability depending on the nature of the subject matter, culture, logistical constraints, and so forth. In other words, no single regime or programme of public participation can be prescribed and the courts will not use any litmus test to determine if public participation has been achieved or not. The only test the courts use is one of effectiveness. A variety of mechanisms may be used to achieve public participation.c.Third, whatever programme of public participation is fashioned, it must include access to and dissemination of relevant information. See Republic v The Attorney General & another ex parte Hon Francis Chachu Ganya (JR Misc App No 374 of 2012. In relevant portion, the court stated:“Participation of the people necessarily requires that the information be availed to the members of the public whenever public policy decisions are intended and the public be afforded a forum in which they can adequately ventilate them.”d.Fourth, public participation does not dictate that everyone must give their views on the issue at hand. To have such a standard would be to give a virtual veto power to each individual in the community to determine community collective affairs. A public participation programme, must, however, show intentional inclusivity and diversity. Any clear and intentional attempts to keep out bona fide stakeholders would render the public participation programme ineffective and illegal by definition. In determining inclusivity in the design of a public participation regime, the government agency or public official must take into account the subsidiarity principle: those most affected by a policy, legislation or action must have a bigger say in that policy, legislation or action and their views must be more deliberately sought and taken into account.e.Fifth, the right of public participation does not guarantee that each individual’s views will be taken as controlling; the right is one to represent one’s views – not a duty of the agency to accept the view given as dispositive. However, there is a duty for the government agency or public official involved to take into consideration, in good faith, all the views received as part of public participation programme. The government agency or public official cannot merely be going through the motions or engaging in democratic theatre so as to tick the constitutional box.f.Sixthly, the right of public participation is not meant to usurp the technical or democratic role of the office holders but to cross-fertilize and enrich their views with the views of those who will be most affected by the decision or policy at hand.
186.Even though the petitioners raised the issue of lack of public participation, stakeholder consultations and administratively fair procedures, none of the respondents and interested parties responded to the issue. As such, the issue is uncontroverted.
187.Another salvo launched against the impugned regulations is that the impugned regulations discriminate against independent candidates as against the candidates who are nominated by political parties.
188.Perhaps, it is imperative to have a brief look at the subject of discrimination. A Multi-Judge bench in Petition 56, 58 & 59 of 2019 (Consolidated), Nubian Rights Forum & 2 others v Attorney General & 6 others; Child Welfare Society & 9 others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR discussed the subject of discrimination under article 27 as follows: -
983.The precise meaning and implication of the right to equality and non-discrimination has been the subject of numerous judicial decisions in this and other jurisdictions. In its decision in Jacqueline Okeyo Manani & 5 others v Attorney General & another (supra)the High Court stated as follows with respect to what amounts to discrimination:
26.Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition defines “discrimination” as (1)” the effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain class because of race, age sex, nationality, religion or hardship” (2) “Differential treatment especially a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured”.
27.In the case of Peter K Waweru v Republic [2006] eKLR, the court stated of discrimination thus: -Discrimination means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their descriptions whereby persons of one such description are subjected to … restrictions to which persons of another description are not made subject or have accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description… Discrimination also means unfair treatment or denial of normal privileges to persons because of their race, age sex … a failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured.”(emphasis)
28.From the above definition, discrimination, simply put, is any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of differences to persons or group of persons based such considerations as race, colour, sex, religious beliefs political persuasion or any such attributes that has real or potential effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment between two persons or groups. Article 27 of Constitution prohibits any form of discrimination stating that. (1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law, and that (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.
29.The Constitution advocates for non-discrimination as a fundamental right which guarantees that people in equal circumstances be treated or dealt with equally both in law and practice without unreasonable distinction or differentiation. It must however be borne in mind that it is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment that amounts to discrimination. Discrimination as seen from the definitions, will be deemed to arise where equal classes of people are subjected to different treatment, without objective or reasonable justification or proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed to achieve that aim.
30.In this regard, the court stated in the case of Nyarangi & 3 others v Attorney General [2008] KLR 688 referring to the repealed constitution; “discrimination that is forbidden by constitution involves an element of unfavourable bias. Thus, firstly unfavourable bias must be shown by the complainant; and secondly, the bias must be based on the grounds set in the constitutional definition of the word “discriminatory” in section 82 of the Constitution.
984.It is thus recognised that it is lawful to accord different treatment to different categories of persons if the circumstances so dictate. Such differentiation, however, does not amount to the discrimination that is prohibited by Constitution. In John Harun Mwau v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another (supra), the court observed that:[i]t must be clear that a person alleging a violation of article 27 of Constitution must establish that because of the distinction made between the claimant and others, the claimant has been denied equal protection or benefit of the law. It does not necessarily mean that different treatment or inequality will per se amount to discrimination and a violation of constitution.
985.When faced with a contention that there is a differentiation in legislation and that such differentiation is discriminatory, what the court has to consider is whether the law does indeed differentiate between different persons; if it does, whether such differentiation amounts to discrimination, and whether such discrimination is unfair. In EG & 7 others v Attorney General; DKM & 9 others (Interested Parties); Katiba Institute & another: Petition 150 & 234 of 2016 (Consolidated) the court held that:288.From the above definition, it is safe to state that Constitution only prohibits unfair discrimination. In our view, unfair discrimination is differential treatment that is demeaning. This happens when a law or conduct, for no good reason, treats some people as inferior or less deserving of respect than others. It also occurs when a law or conduct perpetuates or does nothing to remedy existing disadvantages and marginalization.”
986.In Harksen v Lane NO and others (supra) the court observed that the test for determining whether a claim based on unfair discrimination should succeed was as follows:(a)Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate purpose? If it does not, then there is a violation of the Constitution. Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.(b)Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage analysis: -(i)Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’? If it is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.(ii)If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination,’ does it amount to ‘unfair discrimination’? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then the unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation…a.If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause.988.It must also be noted, as observed by Mativo J in Mohammed Abduba Dida v Debate Media Limited & another (supra) that:It is not every differentiation that amounts to discrimination. Consequently, it is always necessary to identify the criteria that separate legitimate differentiation from constitutionally impermissible differentiation. Put differently, differentiation is permissible if it does not constitute unfair discrimination. (emphasis added).
189.The process of registration of voters has been dealt with above. The process does not require the supply of copies of the identification documents by any one seeking to be registered as a voter but only the numbers of the identification documents. For clarity, the Commission does not have copies of identification documents for any one registered as a voter.
190.The requirement for the supply of the copies of the identification documents comes up only at the registration of independent candidates. It, therefore, means that the Commission in seeking the copies of the identification documents of the supporters of independent candidates does so for the first time. In other words, with an exception of the independent candidates, no any other cadre of voters or candidates are supposed to supply such copies of their identification documents.
191.Whereas the independent candidates are different from the candidates nominated by political parties, it cannot be said that the Commission has a repository of copies of identification documents used in registration of voters who are members of political parties such that a like requirement for independent candidates places the two cadres of candidates at par. The requirement for the supply of the copies of the identification documents is only aimed at the independent candidates.
192.Therefore, the differential treatment accorded to the independent candidates is not justified. That infringes article 27 of the Constitution.
193.With the foregoing, there is no doubt that that once a person is registered as a voter, the IEBC retains the particulars of the voter including the details of the National Identity Card or Kenyan passport used in the registration. Such details are sufficient to enable the Commission ascertain the number of supporters in respect to the registration of independent candidates. The impugned regulations, therefore, places a further and unnecessary burden on the independent candidates to supply copies of the identification documents at registration.
194.The upshot is that the impugned regulations are in contravention of articles 2(4), 10, 27, 38(3), 83(3), 99(1)(c), 137(1)(d) and 193(1)(c) of the Constitution.(c)Whether regulations 18(2)(c), 24(2)(c), 28(2)(c) and 36(2)(c) of the Elections (General) Regulations, 2012 (as amended in 2017) contravene article 31 of the Constitution and the Data Protection Act:
195.It was vehemently argued by the petitioners that the call for copies of identity cards is an affront not only to article 31 of the Constitution, but the provisions of the Data Protection Act.
196.The parties’ detailed arguments and submissions are captured in the preceding part of this judgment.
197.Article 31 of the Constitution provides as follows: -Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: -a.their person, home or property searched;b.their possessions seized;c.information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed; ord.the privacy of their communications infringed.
198.The Data Protection Act, No 24 of 2019 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Data Act’) is an Act of Parliament to give effect to article 31(c) and (d) of the Constitution, to establish the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner, to make provision for the regulation of the processing of personal data, to provide for the rights of data subjects and obligations of data controllers and processors and related purposes.
199.A cursory reading of the Data Act unfolds the manner in which the law treats personal information with such seriousness. The law places burdens on specific persons, the data controllers and the data processors, who must be registered with the Data Commissioner with specific duties in dealing with personal data. Indeed, the Data Act sufficiently protects the privacy rights under article 31 of the Constitution.
200.For instance, in part IV, the Data Act robustly provides the principles and obligations of personal data protection. Section 31 provides for Data protection impact assessment to be carried out where a processing operation is likely to result in high risk to the rights and freedoms of a data subject by virtue of its nature, scope, context and purposes prior to the processing of such data.
201.The impugned regulations require the independent candidates to collect the personal data of their supporters. Such a duty is provided for in the Data Act and only specific persons are authorized to do so. The impugned regulations, therefore, did not take such into account and the effect thereof is to, contrary to the law, designate the independent candidates as data controllers and data processors.
202.In this matter whereas the Commission may for good reasons require personal data, it is, nevertheless, supposed to ensure that the collection and security of such data is within the Constitution and law.
203.It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Commission to provide appropriate legal framework for the collection and protection of the data and the right to privacy.
204.At the moment, the security of the data collected by the independent candidates cannot be assured, the period the Commission will hold such information and the manner in which it will be disposed remains a mirage. The Commission did not even indicate whether it carried out a data protection impact assessment.
205.The upshot is that the Commission cannot escape the discharge of such an onerous obligation. In the midst of failure to comply with the law, the danger to unlawfully deal with or expose personal data by both the independent candidates and the Commission is eminent.
206.Without much ado, it is ostensible that the manner in which the independent candidates and the Commission are to deal with the collection and retention of the copies of the identification documents of the supporters of the independent candidates does not guarantee the protection of the privacy rights under article 31 of Constitution.
207.To that extent, this court finds and hold that the implementation of the impugned regulations variously infringes the Data Protection Act and article 31 of the Constitution.(d)Whether the Political Parties Act should be amended to variously provide for independent candidates:
208.Some Petitioners have put forth a case for the amendment of the Political Parties Act to accommodate the independent candidates in many ways.
209.Having carefully considered the nature of the proposed amendments, I am of the position that the issues raised do not fall within the purview of this court. Such are matters which are not ripe for adjudication before a court of law and they would be properly dealt with by Parliament.
210.Whereas the participation of independent candidates in elections in Kenya is gaining traction and there may be need for some regulation in many areas, the most appropriate way to pursue such is to petition Parliament under article 119 of the Constitution. The provision states as follows: -
119.Right to petition Parliament(1)Every person has a right to petition Parliament to consider any matter within its authority, including to enact, amend or repeal any legislation.(2)Parliament shall make provision for the procedure for the exercise of this right.
211.In reinforcing the position that courts exist to resolve actual disputes, the High Court inNairobi High Court Constitutional Petition No. E090 of 2022 (as consolidated) Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & others v The Hon. Attorney General & others (unreported) stated as follows: -
74.Courts exist to resolve actual disputes. They are not in the business of engaging in academic or abstract discourse that is not anchored in disputed facts. That is why the Constitution does not confer upon this court the jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions. The court in John Harun Mwau and 3 others v Attorney General [2012] eKLR, held that it could not deal with hypothetical issues and that the jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution under article 165(3)(d) does not exist in a vacuum and is not exercised independently in the absence of a real dispute. The court explained that the jurisdiction is exercised in the context of a controversy.
75.The aforesaid position is encapsulated in the principles of mootness, ripeness and justiciability as explained by Onguto J., in Wanjiru Gikonyo & others v National Assembly of Kenya & 4 others Petition No 453 of 2015 [2016] eKLR as follows:
(27)Effectively, the justiciability dogma prohibits the court from entertaining hypothetical or academic interest cases. The court is not expected to engage in abstract arguments. The court is prevented from determining an issue when it is too early or simply out of apprehension, hence the principle of ripeness. An issue before the court must be ripe, through a factual matrix, for determination.
(28)Conversely, the court is also prevented from determining an issue when it is too late. When an issue no longer presents an existing or live controversy, then it is said to be moot and not worthy of taking the much-sought judicial time. ……
76.The application of the aforementioned principles depends on the facts of each case. In the Wanjiru Gikonyo case (supra), the learned Judge, again stated:
(34)……. There is settled policy with clear arguments as well as out of repetitive precedent that courts and judges are not advise-givers. The court ought not to determine issues which are not yet ready for determination or is only of academic interest having been overtaken by events. The court ought not to engage in premature adjudication of matters through either the doctrine of ripeness or of avoidance. It must not decide on what the future holds either.
(35)It is however to be noted that the court retains the discretion to determine whether on the circumstances of any matter before it still ought to be determined.
212.On the basis of the foregoing, this court reiterates the position that the duty to amend the Political Parties Act lie with Parliament.
213.As I come to the end of this issue, I will address the issue of laches which was raised by some of the respondents.
214.In declining the respondents’, I will only refer to the Court of Appeal in Metal Box Co Ltd v Currys Ltd, (1988) 1 All ER 341 and Kariuki Kiboi v Attorney General [2017] eKLR, Nairobi Civil Appeal No 90 of 2015, where the Court of Appeal heard and determined a claim which arose in the mid-1980s and a petition was filed in 2010. The court then made the following findings on whether one can acquiesce to an infringement of their human rights and fundamental freedoms: -
61.Guided and convinced of the sound jurisprudence that there is no time limit for filing a constitutional petition, we find the ground that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the petition on account of delay, acquiescence and laches has no merit. Unless expressly stated in the Constitution, the period of limitation in the Limitation of Actions Act do not apply to violation of rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. The law concerning limitation of actions cannot be used to shield the State or any person from claims of enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms protected under the Bill of Rights.(Emphasis added)
215.With respect to the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel the court rendered itself as follows: -
64.We have considered submissions by counsel on estoppel and acquiescence. In our view, there can be no estoppel against the Constitution which is the paramount law of the land. Subject to the express provisions of article 24 of the 2010 Constitution, no individual can barter away fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. One can neither acquiesce nor waive the fundamental rights and freedoms protected in the Constitution. Fundamental rights were not kept in the Constitution simply for individual benefits - these rights were put up as a matter of public policy and therefore the doctrine of inordinate delay, estoppel, acquiescence or waiver cannot unequivocally be applied as a bar to enforcement of fundamental rights. We are cognizant that the doctrine of laches is a principle of general application that may apply in constitutional petitions for breach of fundamental rights. However, delay in enforcing a claim for violation of fundamental rights may be permitted or denied depending on the circumstances of each case.
65.…. In line with article 20 of the Constitution, respect for fundamental rights is a mandatory obligation on the State and all state organs and the Bill of Rights applies to all and bind all citizens. No citizen can by his act or conduct relieve the state, a state organ or any person of the solemn obligation to respect the Bill of Rights. It is in this context that no individual can acquiesce to violation or infringement of fundamental rights. Subject to express constitutional provisions, such as the limitations in article 24 of the Constitution, neither the state nor an individual can arrogate to itself/himself a right or justification to commit a breach of fundamental rights of any citizen and resort to the doctrine of waiver, acquiescence, inordinate delay, estoppel or other similar principle as absolute defence or excuse.(Emphasis added)
216.The court further stated that: -
67.On our part, based on the sacrosanct and inviolable nature of the Bill of Rights, convinced that respect for and enforcement of the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of political stability in Kenya; persuaded that property and land rights is the foundation of socio-economic relationship in Kenya and further persuaded by merits of comparative jurisprudence cited above and convinced that no individual can barter away and acquiesce to violation of fundamental rights, we find that the trial court did not err in failing to apply the doctrine of laches, estoppel and acquiesce in this matter.(Emphasis added).