REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 744  OF 2002

EMMANUEL  MWANGEMI MWANSI ………………APPELLANT

VERSUS

TEITA SISAL ESTATE LIMITED  …………………..RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises from the judgment  and decree of the Resident  Magistrate Mrs E. Maina (as she then was) dated  8^th November  2002 in Nairobi CMCC No. 8921 of 2000.
2. The appellant, Emmanuel Mwangemi Mwasi was the  plaintiff in  the subordinate  court.  He  sued  the respondent  Teita Estate  Limited  by a plaint  dated 9^th November  1999 claiming for  damages  for the injuries  that he allegedly  sustained on 6^th March  1007 while he  was  engaged  upon his  duties at the respondent/employer’s premises, while   brushing the floor, he slipped and thereby injuring himself.  He  allegedly sustained injuries involving:

1. Bruising in the chest and  back.
2. Presently pain in the chest area.

3. He claimed for  general damages  and special damages of shs 2000 costs of the suit and  interest at  court rates. The appellant blamed the respondent, his employer for the accident  and injury and set out  particulars of  negligence and breach of statutory duty of care.
4. The respondent filed defence dated 23^rd January 2001 denying  the appellant’s  claim and allegation of negligence/breach of  statutory  duty of care.  It also denied  that the appellant  was  injured  while on duty as claimed and  also set  out  particulars of  the appellant’s  own negligence, while maintaining  that in any event the appellant engaged upon duties  which  were not  allocated to him.
5. The lower court record shows that the suit  was set down for  hearing.  On 16^th October  2001, the parties  appeared to be negotiating  for  a settlement  hence it  was slated for mention on 26^th November  2001 with a view to recording  a settlement  which was never reached  and  on 26^th November  2001  the matter   was stood over generally.
6. On 29^th October  2002, the matter  came up for  hearing  which date   was fixed  by consent  before  E.N. Maina  on 17^th September 2002 when it  was adjourned  because the doctor  was  not available.
7. On 29^th October  2002,  the court  record shows that the plaintiff  was not in court and only  Miss Ombima for the defendant/respondent herein  was in  court.   The court  set  the hearing for  10.50 a.m.
8. At  10.50  a.m, the trial magistrate  recorded that the plaintiff  was still absent.  The defence  case proceeded with 3 witnesses  and its case closed.  Judgment  was slated for 8^th November  2002 at 2.30 pm.
9. On 8^th November, judgment  was delivered  in the presence of  Ms Ombima for the defendant  and Mrs  Nyamu held brief for  Mr  Oduk advocate for the plaintiff.
10. In the brief judgment, the  trial magistrate found that  the plaintiff/appellant  had not attended  court to prosecute her case and that the defence  had called  evidence  to controvert  her pleadings that  she had  on  6^th March 1997 slipped and fallen  at her place of work.  The trial magistrate accordingly dismissed the appellant’s case  with costs to the respondent.  It is  that judgment that  provoked  this appeal by the  appellant.
11. The Memorandum of Appeal  filed on 4^th December  2002  and  dated  the same  day sets out the following 5 grounds  of appeal namely:

1. That  the trial court erred  in fact  in calling  for the  proceedings with  the suit in the absence  of the plaintiff when  the same  did not  appear and  was not  listed in the daily cause list.
2. The learned trial magistrate erred in law and  in fact in  calling for  the hearing   of the suit  at an  earlier  time (10.15 a.m.) than the  time she had already  allocated  for the hearing  to take place  (11.00am) and thereby denied the plaintiff  a chance to  present his  case.
3. The learned  trial magistrate erred  in law  in failing to conduct the proceedings  according  to law by taking only ( unprocedurally) the defendant’s case.
4. The learned trial magistrate erred  in dismissing  the suit allegedly for want of  prosecution on the grounds that the defendant had  rebutted the claim yet  the defendant  prosecuted the claim  and the  plaintiff’s case  was  not presented  to afford  the defence  an opportunity  of rebuttal.
5. The  whole trial  was mischievous  and a nullity and the exercise  was prejudicial  to the plaintiff’s case.

12. The appellant  prayed that the  appeal be allowed and the  judgment dated 8^th November  2002  be set aside; and that  the court do order the suit  remanded for hearing  before  any other magistrate.
13. The appeal  was admitted to hearing on 19^th March 2014  despite  the earlier  attempts  to have it dismissed for want of  prosecution.
14. On 15^th December  2015  parties advocates  Mr Oduk  for the appellant  and Miss  Kairu for  the respondent  appeared  before me and argued  the appeal orally. None of the parties relied on any decided case or statutory provisions of the law.
15. In his submissions, Mr Oduk submitted, relying on the grounds  of appeal as set out  in the Memorandum of Appeal.  According to Mr Oduk, the  proceedings  in the subordinate  court do  not reflect  that the  file  had been placed  aside  for hearing at 11.00 am.  He attacked  the decision by the trial  magistrate  in allowing  the defendant  to present  its case in rebuttal. 
16. Further , he complained  that the time  allocated for the hearing  was  not adhered  to and instead  the file  was called  at 10.50 thereby  misleading  the parties.  That when  counsel  went to  court at 11.00 am he found when  the matter  had been concluded.  It was further submitted that it  was an exercise  which  was a nullity as the court  ought not to  have allowed the  defendant/respondent to rebut  its case in the absence of the plaintiff.  He  urged this court to allow   the appeal, set aside the order of  dismissal and reinstate  the  suit for  hearing and determination  on merits  with costs.
17. The appeal was opposed  by  Miss Kairu  who submitted that the lower  court record  was  clear that the suit  was to be heard at 10.50 am and not  11.00a.m.  Further, that the appellant has never shown any interest in prosecuting this appeal which  was filed  in 2008 and which has  taken more than  7 years  to have it prosecuted.  She prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs to the respondent.
18. In a rejoinder, Mr Oduk counsel for the appellant  submitted  that the  court erred by proceeding in  the absence of the plaintiff and gave judgment  on 8^th November  2002 and the appeal  was filed on                 4^th December  2002.  That delay  in prosecuting  this appeal is  administrative delay  which is not  material before  the court.  Further, that the file had  been left  in the registry when the appellant’s counsel went and  had it brought before  the magistrate on the material  day and that counsel  protested the hearing  in the  plaintiff’s  and his counsel’s absence  but that  the trial magistrate  threw  the file at  the advocate saying he could  read it  for himself.
19. This being  the first appeal, I am  reminded  of my primary  role to         re-evaluate, reassess  and re- analyze  the extracts  on the record   and then  determine  whether  the  conclusions  reached  by the trial court are to  stand or  not and  give reasons  either way ( See Kenya  Ports Authority  V Kuston (Kenya) Ltd (2009) 2 EA 212 wherein the Court of Appeal held, inter alia that:

“On a first  appeal from the High Court, the Court of Appeal should reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it  should  always bear in mind   that it  has neither  seen nor   heard   the witnesses  and should make   due allowance  in that respect.  Secondly, that the responsibility of the court is to rule on the evidence on record and not to introduce extraneous matters not dealt with by the parties in the evidence.”

20. In my assessment, based on the rival arguments  set out above, the appeal herein  is hinged on the following  questions/issues:

1. Whether  the trial magistrate erred in law  and fact in  proceeding  to hear the defence case in the absence of the plaintiff to prosecute  his case.
2. Whether  this appeal  is competent.
3. Whether   this appeal  has any merits.
4. What orders   the court should  make.
5. Who should bear costs  of the appeal.

21. I shall determine the above issues together. On whether  the trial court  erred in law and  fact in proceeding to hear  the defence  case in the absence of the plaintiff to testify, the appellant  contends that  it  was unprocedural for the trial court  to let   the defence witnesses  testify as if the plaintiff  had prosecuted and closed its  case.  The law  applicable  for dismissal  of suits for non attendance  to prosecute  is the old order IXB Rule 4(1)  of the old Civil Procedure Rules which  provide that:

“ If  on the day fixed for  hearing after the suit  has been called on for hearing   after the suit  has been called on for  hearing outside  the court, only the defendant  attends  and he admits  no part of  the claim, the suit  shall be dismissed  except  for good cause  to be recorded by the court.”

22. Thus  the law requires the court to dismiss the suit, if  the plaintiff is absent, on  the day fixed  for hearing  the suit, but if there  is good cause, which must be recorded.  It is  for  the trial court to determine  what  ‘good cause’ is.
23. Under Order IXB Rule  8 of the Old Civil Procedure  Rule, “ where judgment  has been entered  under this  order, the court, on application by summons, may set aside or vary judgment  and any consequential  decree or order upon such terms  as are just.”
24. In Peter Ngome  V Plantex  Company Ltd [1983] e KLR, the  Court of Appeal, when interpreting  the provisions of Order IXB Rule  4 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules stated that:

“ In my view,  a judgment  is  a judicial determination or decision  of a court  on the main questions  in a proceeding  and  includes s a dismissal of the proceedings  or a suit under  Order IXB Rule 4(1) or under  any other  provision of the law. A dismissal  of the suit   under Order IXB Rule 4(1) is a judgment for the defendant  against the  plaintiff.  An application under Order 1XB Rule  3 includes  application to set aside  the dismissal.  This  must be so because when neither  party attends  court  on the day fixed  for hearing, after the suit  has been called on for hearing  outside  the court, the court  may dismiss the suit and  in that  event, either  party may apply  under Rule  8 to have the  dismissed suit set aside or  the plaintiff  may bring  a fresh  suit subject to any law of  limitation of actions…….This, I  think, clearly shows that  Rule 7(2)  was intended  to bar a  plaintiff whose suit  has been  dismissed  under Rule 4(1)  only from bringing  a fresh suit.  That  provision does not  bar such a plaintiff  from applying for the dismissal to  be set aside  under Rule 8.”

25. The above  Court of Appeal, citing  Herman Magachia V Hamis  Mwakibundu  & Another CA NOS.  59 and 89 of  1983 ( unreported) stated; Obiter:

“ Rule  4 provides for entering judgment  in default  by the  plaintiff to attend court on  the day fixed for  hearing his case and Rule  8  is the provision  under which h an application to set aside  such exparte judgment  under Order  IXB may be made.”

26. In Mulla on Indian Civil  Procedure Code  page  802  paragraph 2-

“ A plaintiff whose suit is dismissed  under Rule 8 for   default of  appearance on  the day  fixed for  the hearing, cannot  appeal  from the order  of dismissal, as  such an order  is not a decree…but  may  apply under  this rule for  an order set  aside the order  of dismissal.”

27. In this case however, the trial magistrate  upon finding  that the plaintiff/appellant  was  not present  to prosecute his case, went  ahead to  allow the defendant/respondent  to state  its case, call  witnesses, produce  exhibits  and she proceeded  to deliver  a judgment  and therefore  a decree had to issue, dismissing the appellant’s  suit with costs.  It is for that  reason that there  was a decree that the  appellant had to fie  this appeal.  However, had the  suit been dismissed  for non attendance  without the  defence  which had no counterclaim adducing  evidence, the appellant  had an unfettered  right under Order  12  Rule 7 to apply for setting aside the  order of  dismissal of his suit for non attendance. It is at that stage of the application that the appellant  could have, by way of affidavit  evidence, provided  the reasons  for the failure to attend court  at  10.50 for hearing  of his case leading  to its dismissal. 
28. The appellant’s  counsel has submitted that it  was an  error   of law to proceed  with the defence  hearing at 10.50 am  when the  hearing had   been slated for  11.00 a.m and that  by the time he  arrived in court at  11.00am the hearing had been concluded  and an altercation between him and the trial magistrate  ensued  leading to her throwing the file  at him to read the file for  himself.
29. In my humble view, those  submissions may be evidence of  what transpired  in court on the  material date of the hearing yet they are not made  on oath.  Submissions  cannot be  taken to be evidence  and this court  would not  be correct if  it  were to take  those submissions as evidence and rely  on them to determine the merits of this appeal.   However, this  court is entitled  to reexamine the record  of the lower court  and make its own independent  conclusion.
30. As stated in the background  information summarized  hereinabove , the lower  court   record for  29^th October  2002 when the suit   was by consent  of both parties  of 17^th September  2002  slated for  hearing, only the defendant’s  counsel Ms Ombima   was recorded  to be in court. The court  then recorded the time for  hearing which  is erased and overwritten  with 10.50 am .  The original writing before  the overwriting  appear to be  11.00 am. Later at 10.50 am, the  court  recorded that  the plaintiff  was  still absent   and DW1 was sworn to testify for the defence.  Two other  witnesses  testified  for the defence and  judgment  was reserved  for 8^th November  2002  at 2.30pm.  The said  judgment  was delivered  promptly  on 8^th November  2002  as scheduled  in the  presence of  the plaintiff’s counsel’s representative  hence the filing of  this appeal.
31. The appellant  complains that   the court record  in the lower court does not  reflect  that the file had been placed aside  for hearing at  11.00a.m.   That the file had initially  been left  in the registry and  Mr Oduk  went  for it.  That  he also  appeared before  the trial magistrate on the material  day and protested the hearing  in their absence  but she  threw  the file at  him saying  he should read  the file himself.
32. As I have  stated, that information  on the altercation is  not on record  for consideration.  Nonetheless, there is  evidence of  the trial court  proceeding  to hear  the defence case and  writing  and delivering  judgment  on 8^th November 2002 dismissing  the plaintiff/appellant’s case with costs  to  the defendant/respondent.
33. In my humble view, there  was a serious  procedural lapse  on the part  of the trial   magistrate.  That  procedural  lapse  in my view, went to the core  of the  legal process  in the sense   that it denied  the appellant  an opportunity to be heard  on his claim to  ventilate  his grievances.  He was  ousted  from the judgment  seat.   There  was  evidence  that the parties  had  as at  16^th November  2001  been  attempting  an out  of court settlement  which did not  bear fruit hence the hearing.  On 19^th September 2002, the suit   was adjourned by the court which stated that it could not proceed with a part heard case as the doctor  was said  to be absent.  Then on 29th October 2002, the record by the  trial magistrate  shows that  the matter  was slated for hearing at 11.00am but erased and overwritten to left  10.50 a.m.   The plaintiff’s  advocate appears to have gone to court after  11.00am and  was  furious that the file he had allegedly tracked  from the registry  had been  heard and concluded.  No one  appears to be precise  with the exact  timings of the hearing since, going by the  lengthy proceedings on record  covering  3 witnesses  this court doubts  that the case  could have proceeded  and   been concluded  within  10 minutes.  However, the erasures  and  overwriting  by the trial magistrate  on the time for hearing created  doubt  in the mind of this court as to whether indeed  the trial proceeded at the allocated time  or  was changed  to the detriment of the appellant.
34. There also appears to have developed bad blood between the appellant’s counsel  and the trial magistrate.
35. In my humble view, there being no provision for hearing of the defendant’s case other than a  counterclaim  where the  plaintiff fails to attend court, the decision by the trial magistrate  to hear the defence  case  was unprocedural. It is for that reason alone that  I would  allow this appeal.
36. The  appellant’s  counsel prayed  that this court  sets aside  the order of dismissal  and reinstates  the suit for  hearing  and determination on merits.  Section 78  of the Civil Procedure Act  gives power  to the appellate  court to:

a. Determine  a case finally,

b. Remand a case.

c. Frame issues and refer them for trial.

d. Take  additional evidence  or to  require  evidence to be taken

e. To order for a new trial;

2. Perform  as nearly  as may  be the  same duties as are conferred  and imposed  by  the Act  on courts or original  jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted  therein.

37.   Under Order 42 Rule  24  of the Civil Procedure Rules, this court  is empowered to remand  a case where  the suit  was  disposed  of upon  a preliminary point  and the decree  is reversed  on appeal. further, Order  42 Rule   26 empowers   this  court to order for a  new trial to be heard upon setting aside   decree of the trial court . In the instant  case, as  the decree/judgment  entered  by the trial  court  was irregular, I find that  this is  a proper  case for a new trial  in order to accord the  appellant/plaintiff an opportunity  to be heard on the merits  of his claim.
38. Accordingly, I allow this appeal, set aside  the judgment  and decree of the trial magistrate  in Milimani CMCC No. 8921/2000 and  order that  the said  suit  shall be reheard  by the subordinate  court  presided over by another magistrate since the trial magistrate then is now a High Court Jugde on its  merits interpartes .
39.  In view of the old age of the suit, the lower court file shall be expeditiously remitted to the lower court together with this judgment for the suit to be  heard  on priority basis.  As the  error   was committed  by the trial magistrate  who flouted the procedure for hearing  of cases and or  dismissal for non attendance,  I order that  each party  bear  their own  costs  of this appeal.

Dated, signed  and delivered  in open court   at Nairobi this 9^th day of  March 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of :

Miss Kairu for the Respondent

N/A for appellant

Adline: Court Assistant