The requirement of mandatory membership to the Law Society of Kenya and all its attendant requirements in order to practice in Kenya is constitutional

Eunice Nganga & another v Law Society of Kenya & another [2019] eKLR

Petition 235 of 2017

High Court at Nairobi

E C Mwita, J

March 14, 2019

Reported By Flora Weru and Kakai Toili

Constitutional Law - constitutional petitions - institution of constitutional petitions - where a person institutes a constitutional petition on behalf of another - whether a person could institute a constitutional petition on behalf of another person -Constitution of Kenya 2010, articles 22 & 258.

Constitutional Law - fundamental rights and freedom - freedom of association -limitation of the freedom of association - mandatory requirement for advocates practicing in Kenya to be members of the Law Society of Kenya - mandatory requirement by the Law Society of Kenya for advocates to apply and be issued with practicing certificates - whether those mandatory requirements infringed upon the freedom of association and thereby unconstitutional - Constitution of Kenya, 2010 article 36; Advocates Act, sections 22(1)(b)(c) and 23; Law Society of Kenya Act, section 7

Constitutional Law - constitutionality of statutes-presumption of constitutionality of statutes-rationale - what were the factors to consider in determining the constitutional validity of a statute - claiming challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory requirement for advocates to be members of the Law Society of Kenya – claim challenging the mandatory requirement by the Law Society of Kenya for advocates to apply and be issued with practicing certificates - Constitution of Kenya, 2010 article 36; Advocates Act, sections 22(1)(b)(c) and 23; Law Society of Kenya Act, section 7 - Advocates (Continuing Professional Development) Rules, 2014 Rules 10 and 11

Brief Facts

The petitioner filed the instant petition challenging the constitutional validity of sections 22(1)(b), (c) and 23 of the Advocates Act; section 7 of the Law Society of Kenya Act; and regulations 10 and 11 of the Advocates (Continuing Legal Education) Regulations, 2004 (regulations).  She contended that those provisions violated the Constitution for making it mandatory for all advocates be members of the Law Society of Kenya and by making continued professional development courses a prerequisite to getting annual practicing certificates. In the petitioner’s view, both mandatory requirements violated her fundamental freedom of association. The respondents stated that the petitioners did not have locus standi and that the institutional framework mechanism under the Advocates Act, the Law Society of Kenya Act and the attendant regulations were meant to create conducive environment for the development of professionally competent advocates with clear channels of responsibility thus engendering transparency and accountability.

Issues

1. Whether the requirement of mandatory membership to the Law Society of Kenya by advocates who intended to practice in Kenya as provided for under section 7 of the Law Society of Kenya Act was unconstitutional for violating the freedom of association of advocates.
2. Whether the requirement of mandatory application and issuance of a practicing certificate to advocates who want to practice in Kenya as provided for under section 22 (1) (b) and (c)  and 23 of the Advocates Act was unconstitutional.
3. Whether rules 10 and 11 of the Advocates (Continuing Professional Development) Rules, 2014 by providing for the mandatory requirement for continued professional development courses by advocates as a prerequisite to getting annual practicing certificates were unconstitutional.
4. Whether a person could institute a constitutional petition on behalf of another person.
5. Who bears the burden of proof in constitutional petitions?
6. What was the rationale of the presumption of constitutionality of statutes?
7. What were the factors to consider in determining the constitutional validity of a statute?

Relevant Provisions of the law

Constitution of Kenya, 2010

Article 33

(1) Every person has the right to freedom of expression, which includes—

(a) freedom to seek, receive or impart information or ideas;

(b) freedom of artistic creativity; and

(c) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.

(2) The right to freedom of expression does not extend to—

(a) propaganda for war;

(b) incitement to violence;

(c) hate speech; or

(d) advocacy of hatred that—

(i) constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to cause harm; or

(ii) is based on any ground of discrimination specified or contemplated in Article 27 (4).

(3) In the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, every person shall respect the rights and reputation of others.

Article 36

1) Every person has the right to freedom of association, which includes the right to form, join or participate in the activities of an association of any kind.

(2) A person shall not be compelled to join an association of any kind.

(3) Any legislation that requires registration of an association of any kind shall provide that—

1. registration may not be withheld or withdrawn unreasonably; and
2. there shall be a right to have a fair hearing before a registration is cancelled.

Advocates Act Cap 16

Section 22

 (1) Application for a practising certificate shall be made to the Registrar—

1. by delivering to him an application in duplicate, signed by the applicant specifying his name and place of business, and the date of his admission as an advocate;
2. by producing evidence satisfactory to the Registrar that the applicant has paid to the Society the fee prescribed for a practising certificate and the annual subscriptions payable for the time being to the Society and to the Advocates Benevolent Association; and
3. by producing a written approval signed by the Chairman of the Society stating that there is no objection to the grant of the certificate

Section 23

1. Every advocate to whom a practising certificate is issued under this Part shall thereupon and without payment of any further fee, subscription, election, admission or appointment, and notwithstanding anything contained in the Law Society of Kenya Act (Cap. 18) or in any regulations made thereunder, become a member of the Society and the Advocates Benevolent Association and be subject to any provision of law or rule of the Society and the Advocates Benevolent Association for the time being affecting the members thereof.
2. Every advocate who has become a member of the Society under this section shall remain a member until the end of one month after expiration of his practising certificate, unless his name, whether at his own request or otherwise, is removed from or struck off the Roll, whereupon he shall cease to be a member of the Society.
3. (2A) The Society shall issue to every advocate registered with it a stamp or seal bearing the advocate's name, admission number and the year of practice in such form as may be approved by the Council of the Society and prescribed in regulations, and such stamp or seal shall be affixed on every document drawn by such advocate and lodged for registration in any registry in Kenya or issued for any other professional purpose.
4. An advocate who has become a member of the Society under this section and who is suspended from practice shall not be entitled during the period of the suspension to any of the rights or privileges of such membership.

Law of Society Act

Section 7

 (1) The membership of the Society shall consist of—

1. any person who has been admitted as an advocate and whose name has been entered into the Roll of Advocates kept under section 16 of the Advocates Act (Cap. 16);
2. any person admitted to membership under section 8 of this Act; and
3. any person elected as an honorary member of the Society under section 9 of this Act.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), a member of the Society whose name has been, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, struck off the Roll of Advocates shall not be a member of the Society during the period of expulsion.

 (3) A person who has been expelled from membership of the Society shall not be re-admitted as a member of the Society without the authority of a special resolution.

Advocates (continuing Legal Education) Regulations 2004

Rule 10

10. Standards for programme or workshop

(1) A programme or workshop shall meet the following standards—

1. the content shall be designed so as to improve the professional standards, ethics and competence of the participants;
2. the faculty shall possess the practical or academic experience necessary to conduct the programme or workshop effectively;
3. resource materials shall be of high quality, useful and properly prepared;
4. the programme or workshop shall be presented in a suitable setting, conducive to a good educational environment.

 (2) A provider shall, at the request of the Committee, provide the Committee with information concerning a programme or workshop conducted by the provider, including—

1. any documents describing the programme;
2. the qualifications of anticipated faculty;
3. the method of presentation of materials; and
4. and any other relevant information that the Committee may require.

Duties of Advocates, the Committee and Providers

Rule 11

11. Duties of advocate

1. An advocate who has undertaken continuing legal education shall provide the Committee with a certificate of attendance, information relating to the programme attended, the period of attendance and the provider of the CLE.
2. Every advocate shall maintain records relating to his or her CLE in a manner sufficient to establish compliance with CLE requirements.

The Advocates (Continuing Professional Development) Rules, 2014

Rule 10

For the purposes of these Rules, private study is not an approved activity except where it involves the private study of audio, video or electronic material and such study is considered an approved activity by the Committee and for which an advocate may accrue only one-unit.

Rule 11

Regular or pro bono legal work is not an approved activity except for legal work that is for the purposes of the Legal Aid Programme and for which the Committee shall determine how many units an advocate may accrue in a CPD year for that work.

Held

1. The issue of locus standi (right to bring a legal action) was no longer a novel one in constitutional petitions. Article 258 of the Constitution resolved the issue when it allowed every person to institute proceedings contending that the Constitution was being violated, infringed or threatened. Proceedings could also be instituted on behalf of the person or others. A petition that contended the impugned provisions were unconstitutional would appear to be perfectly reasonably within the ambit of public interest. If the provisions were unconstitutional, they violated the Constitution and were, therefore, against public interest. The issue of locus standi had no legal basis.
2. There was a rebuttable presumption that a statute or provision was constitutional. The burden was always on the person alleging constitutional invalidity to prove the alleged unconstitutionality. The reasoning being that the Legislature being peoples’ representative understood the problems people faced and, therefore the laws enacted were intended for resolving those problems.
3. To determine constitutional validity, the court had to examine the purpose or effect of the impugned statute or provision. The purpose of enacting a legislation or the effect of implementing it could lead to nullification of the statute or its provision if found to be inconsistent with the Constitution.
4. The legal profession was unique, for it dealt with issues that were dissimilar to those of other professions. It would be difficult to argue, that advocates could join any other profession and still practice the profession. That was because advocates dealt with clients and were accountable to the clients and the Court. The obligations of members of the profession, including holding client funds in the advocate-client accounts regulated by rules contained in the Advocates Act was unique to the profession.  It was not clear how one who was not a member of the 1^st respondent could be subjected to regulation by the professional body responsible for the wellbeing of the profession body of advocates.
5. A different organ could not regulate the legal profession. The petitioners had to be members of the 1^st respondent compulsory membership did not violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. The legal profession was unique compared to other professions. The services advocates rendered could not be understood by many outside the legal profession. The sentiments and suggestions the petitioners advanced in support of their quest, could not apply to the legal profession. Self-regulation was the best way of ensuring a robust and effective advocates’ body, and that obtained in other countries of the world where the legal professions regulated themselves.
6. There was no inconsistence between the impugned provisions and the Constitution. The legal profession was a special category and its operations were regulated in a manner that could, in a way, be seen as limiting rights and fundamental freedoms of members. However rights under article 33 and 36 of the Constitution were not absolute. They were capable of limitation in terms of article 24(1) of the Constitution so long as the limitation was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.
7. Section 22 of the Advocates Act was on the application and issuance of practicing certificates. It was a form of regulation on the person to whom a practicing certificate should be issued. That was meant to weed out those who were not qualified members; those suspended and those struck off the Roll from practicing or holding themselves out as advocates.  The impugned section 22(1)(b) required one to produce satisfactory evidence that s/he had paid the applicable charges to the 1^st respondent. The charges were for purposes of sustaining the 1^st respondent’s activities for the fulfilment of its mandate under the Act. That was not inconsistent with the Constitution; the petitioners had not shown how the requirement to pay charges to their professional body violated the Constitution to render the provision constitutionally invalid.
8. Section 22(1)(c) of the Advocates Act required one to produce a written approval signed by the President of the 1^st respondent to the effect that there was no objection to the issuance of the certificate. That was meant to ensure that only qualified persons and those that had met their obligations to the 1^st respondent, were allowed to take out practising certificates. The requirement was intended to protect the profession and its members from intrusion by non-members as well as protect the profession from being infiltrated by quacks. That was a positive step in the protection of the society and those seeking services of professional members of the 1^st respondent.
9. One of the reasons why a practicing certificate was issued was to disqualify any person who had been suspended from practice. The occasion for issuing the certificate was also the occasion for checking, among other things, that the applicant was an admitted Advocate and had paid the prescribed practicing fees to the 1^st respondent as well as to the Advocates Benevolent Association. There was no constitutional fault in section 22 (1) (b) and (c) of the Advocates Act.
10. Section 23 of the Advocates Act served to determine those who joined the profession as members of the 1^st respondent. Section 23 was clear that once one applied for the practising certificate in terms of section 22 of the Advocates Act, and the Chief Registrar was satisfied with the suitability to issue the certificate, the issuance conferred on the holder the benefit of joining a member of the 1^st respondent. That was; membership to the 1^st respondent was reserved to those who were qualified and on the Roll of Advocates. Doing away with that provision as the petitioners craved, would cause confusion in the legal profession because it would be infiltrated by quacks which would ultimately damage the affairs of the 1^st respondents, including issues of discipline of its members.
11. Kenya’s Bill of Rights was very expansive and protected rights and fundamental freedoms of every person.  Although article 33 and 36 of the Constitution formed part of the provisions in the Bill of Rights, the rights under those articles were not absolute. The articles had to be read in conjunction with article 24(1) of the Constitution so that the limitation, if any, had to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.
12. The limitation the petitioners complained of was by law, the Advocates Act and the Law Society of Kenya Act and Rules. The impugned law was reasonable in that it sought to protect the profession and members of the public who sought services from qualified and professional advocates. To that extent, only qualified advocates and only advocates holding practicing certificates should render professional services. That made the limitation justifiable, for it was for the benefit of the profession and the public. There was no less restrictive means of dealing with the situation than through the impugned provisions.
13. The Advocates (Continuing Professional development) Rules, 2014 required advocates to regularly attend programmes of the 1st respondent as a way of enhancing knowledge and professional skills. One was required to accumulate points which would be considered when applying for the annual practicing certificate. A certificate could not be issued where one had not satisfied those requirements.
14. The law kept changing and so were practice matters. Members of professional bodies such as those of the 1^st respondent had to keep themselves abreast with new developments in the law and practice. The only way they could do so was through regular training. Attending programmes initiated and developed by their society for their benefit could not be deemed unconstitutional. That was because the programmes were meant to enhance the knowledge and skills of the members. If the petitioners’ argument was to carry the day, it would render the profession moribund in terms enhancing knowledge and skills.
15. The petitioners had failed to demonstrate the constitutional invalidity of the impugned provisions, or how they violated any of the rights in the Bill of Rights. As a professional body the 1^st respondent had the mandate to discharge for the benefit of its members and the public.

Petition dismissed, each party to bear own costs.

The National Land Commission does not have jurisdiction to revoke Titles even though it was established that they were acquired unlawfully

Mwangi Stephen Muriithi v National Land Commission & 3 others

Petition No. 100 of 2017

High Court at Nairobi

W A Okwany, J

December 7, 2018

Reported by Chelimo Eunice

Statutes- interpretation of statutes-interpretation of section 14 of the National Land Commission Act- whether section 14 of the National Land Commission Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it granted powers to the National Land Commission to review all grants or dispositions of public land – whether the National Land Commission was vested with review powers pursuant to article 68 (c) (v) as read together with articles 67 (e) and 67(3) of the Constitution- whether section 14 (4) of the National Land Commission Act which empowered the National Land Commission to make a determination instead of recommendations to the Registrar contravened the Constitution-Constitution of Kenya, 2010, articles 68 (c) (v), 67 (2) (e) & 67(3); National Land Commission Act, section 14.

Jurisdiction - jurisdiction of the National Land Commission - whether the National Land Commission had jurisdiction to revoke titles, grants or dispositions of land- whether the National Land Commission had  jurisdiction to revoke  titles to land  even where it  finds, after  an inquiry, that such  title  was  irregularly  or illegally  acquired - whether the National Land Commission could revoke title to land or it could only issue recommendations for the Registrar to revoke title to land - Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 67 (2) (e); National land Commission Act, , section 14.

Constitutional law-rights and fundamental freedoms-right to fair administrative action and fair hearing – where notice to interested parties was issued through print media-where the notice did not outline details of any complaint-whether such notice was sufficient and/or adequate- whether the National Land Commission in failing to furnish the petitioner with the complaint and to carry out proper investigations and to render a decision and reasons subsequent to the hearing violated the petitioner’s right to fair administrative action and fair hearing- Constitution of Kenya 2010, articles 47 & 50, Fair Administrative Actions Act, section 4.

Land law-National Land Commission–functions of the National Land Commission – whether the National Land Commission was the entity empowered to review grants and dispositions of public land- whether the National Land Commission was the entity competent to make a binding finding as to whether property has been unlawfully acquired -Constitution of Kenya, 2010, articles 68 (c) (v) & 40(6).

Brief facts;

The National Land Commission (NLC), after reviewing the legality of the petitioner’s title, revoked and replaced the petitioner as the proprietor of the suit land. Aggrieved by that decision, the petitioner petitioned the Court arguing, among others, that the entire process carried out by NLC including the purported exercise of power to review grants and dispositions of public land, the publication of the notice calling for hearing, the conduct of the hearing and the purported revocation was conducted in an unconstitutional manner that offends the principles of natural justice, that the Constitution did not vest NLC with power to revoke titles, that the NLC was not the body contemplated under article 68 (c) (v) of the Constitution and that section 14 of the National Land Commission Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to grant powers to the NLC that it could not constitutionally perform.

Issues:

1. Whether the Court had jurisdiction to handle the matter involving alleged violation of the right to fair administrative action and fair hearing.
2. Whether the National Land Commission had jurisdiction to review all grants or dispositions of public land.
3. Whether section 14(4) of the National Lands Commission Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it granted the National Land Commission power to make a determination instead of recommendation.

Relevant provisions of the Law

Constitution of Kenya, 2010;

Article 67 (2) (e); The functions of the National Land Commission are to initiate investigations, on its own initiative or on a complaint, into present or historical land injustices, and recommend appropriate redress;

Article 68 (c) (v); Parliament shall enact legislation to enable the review of all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality.

National Land Commission Act;

Section 14: Review of grants and dispositions;

(1) Subject to Article 68(c)(v) of the Constitution, the Commission shall, within

five years of the commencement of this Act, on its own motion or upon a complaint by the national or a county government, a community or an individual, review all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality.

(2) Subject to Articles 40, 47 and 60 of the Constitution, the Commission shall

make rules for the better carrying out of its functions under subsection (1).

(3) In the exercise of the powers under subsection (1), the Commission shall

give every person who appears to the Commission to have an interest in the grant or disposition concerned, a notice of such review and an opportunity to appear before it and to inspect any relevant documents.

(4) After hearing the parties in accordance with subsection (3), the Commission shall make a determination.

(5) Where the Commission finds that the title was acquired in an unlawful

manner, the Commission shall, direct the Registrar to revoke the title.

(6) Where the Commission finds that the title was irregularly acquired, the

Commission shall take appropriate steps to correct the irregularity and may also make consequential orders.

(7) No revocation of title shall be effected against a bona fide purchaser for

value without notice of a defect in the title.

(8) In the exercise of its power under this section, the Commission shall be

guided by the principles set out under Article 47 of the Constitution.

(9) The Commission may, where it considers it necessary, petition Parliament

to extend the period for undertaking the review specified in subsection (1).

Held:

1. Article 165(1) of the Constitution vested wide powers in the High Court including the power to determine the question whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights had been denied, violated, infringed or threatened and the jurisdiction to hear any question respecting the interpretation of the Constitution.
2. According to article 23 (1) of the Constitution, the High Court had jurisdiction, in accordance with article 165, to hear and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights.
3. The High Court had supervisory jurisdiction over any body or authority exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function and it had the power to call for the record of any proceedings before any subordinate court or person, body or authority.
4. Since the petitioner was alleging violation of his rights under the Constitution following the review proceedings undertaken by the NLC, the Court had jurisdiction to handle the matter.
5. The functions of the NLC were provided for under article 67(2)(e) of the Constitution, which included to initiate investigations into present or historical land injustices and recommend appropriate redress. Further, article 68(c)(v) of the Constitution provided for the enactment of legislation to enable the review of all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality.
6. Article 61 (2) of the Constitution classified land as public, community or private.  According to article 62 of the Constitution, public land included land which at the effective date was un-alienated government land and land lawfully held, used or occupied by any State organ, except any such land that was occupied by the State organ as lessee under a private lease.
7. Section 14 of the National Land Commission Act on the other hand mandated the NLC to review all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality within five years of the commencement of the NLC Act.
8. Guided by the provisions of articles 67, 68 (c) (v) of the Constitution and section 14 of the NLC Act, the NLC had jurisdiction to review all grants or dispositions of public land.  The jurisdiction in the context extended only to public land or land that was previously public but was subsequently converted to private land.
9. The title exhibited by the petitioner was a grant.  The land in question was once public land, which was granted to the petitioner by the then President.  The original parcel which was subsequently sub-divided was initially registered in the name of the Permanent Secretary Treasury. One of the Special Condition of the original grant directed that the police were to use the land for purposes of a driving school.  The petitioner obtained change of user by converting the land from public to private use. Since the NLC had jurisdiction to review all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality, it had the mandate to investigate how the instant title was acquired and how the land in question was converted from public to private use.
10.  NLC was the body vested with review powers pursuant to article 68 (c) (v) of the Constitution as read together with articles 67 (e) and 67(3) of the Constitution. In the performance of its legislative function, the enactment of the NLC Act and in particular, section 14 of the said Act was proper. To that extent, section 14 of the NLC Act was not unconstitutional for granting powers to the NLC.
11.  Whereas article 40 of the Constitution protected the right to property, that protection/right did not extend to title founded on an unlawful acquisition. Article 40(6) of the Constitution excluded any property that had been found to have been unlawfully acquired.
12. NLC in discharging its functions by investigating the manner in which the title/ grant in question was acquired acted well within the ambit of articles 40 (6) 67 and 68 (c) (v) of the Constitution.  It was not for the Court to stand in the way of a quasi-judicial body lawfully discharging its constitutional mandate.
13. Article 47(1) of the Constitution granted every person with the right to administrative action that was expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  Article 50(1) of the Constitution on the other hand granted every person the right to have any dispute that could be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court, or if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body.  Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act resonated with article 47 of the Constitution and reiterated the entitlement of every Kenyan to administrative action that was expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
14. The public notice issued by NLC cited L.R numbers and names of interested parties, who were subsequently invited through the same notice to make representations before it.  The notice did not outline details of any complaint.  Adequate notice implied a notice that complied with the principles of natural justice which meant a written notice setting out the date and subject-matter of the hearing, grounds of the complaint, the basic facts in issue and the potential seriousness of the possible result of such hearing.
15. The mode of service of notice adopted by the NLC did not meet the threshold of the principles of natural justice and articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution, hence could not be said to be adequate/ sufficient notice.
16. The right to be heard transcended mere notice and extended to the person being given sufficient information to enable them prepare and/ or present their case.  Such a person was entitled to be furnished, in good time, with information, including reports and documents in the body’s possession that would be prejudicial to his/her case and which would guide that body relied in arriving at its decision.  Section 14(3) of the Act was clear that such a person, apart from entitlement to notice, had the right to inspect any relevant document.
17. The petitioner was neither furnished with the details of the complaint before the NLC nor granted access to the critical documents before the NLC.  In the circumstances, it was unfair to expect or conclude that in the absence of such critical information, the petitioner was granted a fair hearing as envisaged under article 50 of the Constitution. Thus the petitioner was not granted a fair hearing.
18. Article 67(2)(e) of the Constitution empowered the NLC to initiate investigations into present or historical land injustices and recommend appropriate redress. Article 68(c)(v) of the Constitution empowered Parliament to enact legislation to enable the review of all grants or dispositions of public land to establish their propriety.  The legislation anticipated was the National Land Commission Act (the Act).  The Act provided at section 14 for the review of grants and dispositions, pursuant to article 68(c)(v) of the Constitution.  The said section outlined the procedure for the review of grants and disposition of public land to establish their propriety and legality.  Where the NLC under section 15 of the Act found that the title was acquired in an unlawful manner, it should direct the Registrar to revoke the title.
19. There was no provision empowering the NLC to revoke titles even where it was established that the same were unlawfully or irregularly acquired.  The power to revoke title was vested in the Registrar and not the NLC which could only recommend.
20. The provisions of article 67 (2) of the Constitution were clear and overrode the provisions of section 14 (4) of the Act which empowered the NLC to make a determination after hearing the parties.  The Constitution was the supreme law as espoused under article 2 (4) of the Constitution. To the extent that the NLC rendered a determination as opposed to a recommendation, the decision was tainted with illegality.

Petition allowed.

Orders:

1. A declaration that the petitioner’s right to fair administrative action under article 47 of the Constitution as read together with the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 as well as his right to a fair hearing under article 50(1) of the Constitution had been violated.
2. The purported revocation and/or replacement of the petitioner’s proprietorship on L.R 209/13760 with the Kenya Police Service were quashed for being illegal, null and void.
3. No orders as to costs.