John Brown Shilenje v Republic

High Court, Nairobi

4th September 1980

Trevelyan J

Criminal Application No 180 of 1980

Criminal law – trial – venue - transfer to another Court - no fair and impartial trial – test - Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75), section 81(1) (a).

The applicant, a State Counsel, was charged with corruption. He applied for bail on his own bond and, although the Republic’s representative did not oppose the application, the magistrate required a surety. The case was originally fixed for hearing before another magistrate, but was re-allocated and came before the magistrate who heard the application for bail. The applicant applied for the transfer of the case to another magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code, section 81(1)(a), on the ground that he feared that he would not receive a fair trial before the magistrate who had refused bail on his own bond, whom he had previously known socially when they were both working in the same province, that he had conducted prosecutions before the magistrate and they had from time to time “agreed to disagree” on points of law and practice and that an advocate whom the applicant had wished to represent him had declined to do so on grounds of ill-health after speaking with the magistrate on the phone. At the hearing of the application the applicant added that after the alleged phone call he had pleaded with the advocate to ask the Court to accommodate him on such days as his ill-health prevented him from conducting the case. The advocate, however, denied having made any such phone call.

Held:

The application would be dismissed because the refusal of bail on the applicant’s bond alone could not be construed as a suggestion of bias, their earlier social contact did not preclude the magistrate from trying the applicant fairly and impartially, their “agreeing to disagree” with one another on occasions could not support a reasonable apprehension of partiality, it had not been shown that the alleged phone call had taken place, and (even if it had) the applicant’s subsequent plea to the advocate to take the case negated any apprehension of unfairness on the part of the magistrate; accordingly, the incidents referred to by the applicant whether taken individually or collectively would not have created a reasonable apprehension in any right-thinking person’s mind that a fair and impartial trial might not be had before the magistrate.

Re M S Patel’s Application (1913) 5 KLR 66 and

The Republic v Hashimu [1968] EA 656 applied.

Cases referred to in judgment:

1. Hannam v Bradford City Council [1970] 1 WLR 937 [1970]2 All ER 690, England CA.
2. Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Co Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577,
3. [1968] 3 WLR 694, [1968] All ER 304, England CA.
4. Patel’s (MS) Application, Re (1913) 5 KLR 66, Hamilton CJ.
5. Republic, The v Hashmu [1968] EA 656, Saidi J.

Motion

John Brown Shilenje applied to the High Court (Criminal Application No 180 of 1980) for an order transferring his trial on a charge of corruption from the Chief Magistrate to another Court. The facts are set out in Trevelyan J’s judgment.

KC Gautama and SA Wako (instructed by Gautama & Kibuchi) for the Applicant.

B Suttill and J Momanyi Bwonwonga (instructed by the Attorney-General).

Ali v Gethinji

High Court, at Nairobi June 30, 1980

Simpson, Platt & Trainor JJ

Election Petition No 18 of 1979

Election Petition – qualification for election - to National Assembly –proficiency in English and Kiswahili languages – section 34 of the Constitution – language tests under the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulation – failure of election candidate to attend language board test – absence of certificate of proficiency issued by language board - effect of – whether such candidate qualified to be elected – whether Second Schedule to Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Regulations ultra vires the Constitution.

Criminal law – election offence – meaning of – election candidate procuring person to impersonate him in language test prescribed under Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Regulations – whether candidate’s act an election offence.

The two petitioners and the second respondent were among the rival candidates for the Garissa South Parliamentary Constituency preliminary election and the first respondent was the area’s District Commissioner and also the Returning Officer for the election, which was won by the second respondent. The petitioners filed a petition alleging that the election had not been conducted in accordance with the law and sought a declaration that it was null and void. In their main ground, they alleged that the second respondent was not proficient in the English and Swahili languages as envisaged under section 34 of the Constitution in a manner qualifying him for election and evidence was adduced in support of this ground. It was submitted that no certificate of competency had been issued to him by a Language Board set up under the Second Schedule to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations and if any, then it had been issued by means of fraud or personation. Among the issues raised in the defence of the second appellant, who chose not to give evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him, was that the Second Schedule was ultra vires the Constitution.

Held:

1. The Second Schedule to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations and Regulation 4 of those regulations were not ultra vires the Constitution as section 32 of the Constitution which provided for the election of members of the National Assembly in a manner prescribed by or under any law was wide enough to cover, for its purposes, the provision of a method of determining a candidate’s proficiency in the Kiswahili and English languages.

2. The language tests prescribed in the Second Schedule to the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations, where applicable, were part of the nomination process of a candidate to the National Assembly within section 34(d) of the Constitution.

3. The second respondent was not exempted from the language test and there was clear and unequivocal proof that he had not taken the test but had instead procured another person to take it in his place.

4. The second respondent was not a person qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly in that not being exempted from language tests in English and Kiswahili, he failed to present himself to be tested by a language board, that he was not in possession of a certificate of proficiency issued by such board and that he was not able to speak and to read the Kiswahili and English languages well enough to take an active part in the proceedings of the National Assembly.

5. The second respondent was neither validly nominated nor validly elected as a Member of the National Assembly.

6. Qualification for election is a condition precedent for election and section 28 of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (cap 7) was inapplicable in this case.

7. The act of the second respondent in procuring an unknown person to impersonate him did not constitute an election offence as defined in section 2 of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (cap 7).

8. (Obiter) “We feel we cannot leave this petition without suggesting that provision be made to enable a presiding officer to record whether or not a complaint had been made during the day in any way affecting his conduct or the conduct of any of his officers and that the candidates and their agents be afforded an opportunity to sign such a record or to give the presiding officer a note of such complaints as they wish to have put on record. Such a provision might we think tend to reduce the number of complaints appearing in election petition[s]”.

Petition granted.

Cases

1. Lichfield Case (1869) O’M & H 22 at p 28

2. Mohamed Noor Hussein v Mohamed Sheikh Ali Election Petition No 15 of 1970 (unreported)

3. Eliab Karanja v JM Kihanyo and Stephen Kiragu Election Petition No 37 of 1974 (unreported)

Texts

Hailsham, Lord et al. (Eds) Halsbury’s Laws of England, London: Butterworths 4th Edn Vol XV

Statutes

1. Constitution of Kenya section 34, 34(d)

2. National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (cap 7) sections 2, 28

3. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Regulations (cap 7 Sub Leg) regulations 15(2), 17, 18, 18(1); 18(2); 29; First Schedule; Forms  Nos 9, 10; Second Schedule

4. National Assembly Elections (Election Petition) Rules (cap 7 Sub Leg) rules 4, 5

Advocates

Messrs S Gautama & O Kapila for Petitioners

Mr Shields & Mrs Onyango for 1st Respondent

Messrs AR Kapila & S Kapila for the 2nd Respondent

Company Law-winding-up-application for winding-up brought on the ground that the respondent company was insolvent and unable to pay its debts-application to substitute the petitioner- where the original petition was withdrawn because the company was able to pay- claim by the respondents that all the other creditors of the company had been  paid except for one Mutunda and the Applying Creditor-where no demand had been made by the applying creditor-where the court was unable to determine if the company was truly unable to pay its debts–whether the petition could be allowed-section 219 (e) and 220(a) of the Companies Act

James Njoroge Kinyanjui v Republic

High Court, Appellate Side, Nairobi

18th June 1980

Trevelyan & Chesoni JJ

Criminal Appeal No 175 of 1980

Criminal law - rash or negligent act – charge - no allegation of rashness or negligence - charge defective - Penal Code (cap 63), section 243.

Criminal law - rash or negligent act - omission to take precautions against danger from animal - probable danger - need to show animal naturally fierce or vicious - Penal Code (cap 63), section 243(d).

Bail - cash bail - return of bail - entitlement to return - imposition of alternative fine or custodial sentence - order that fine be taken out of cash bail - order improper.

A dog in the possession of the appellant bit the complainant. The appellant was charged with “omitting to take precautions against any probable danger from any animal in his possession contrary to section 243(d) of the Penal Code”. The particulars of the offence also referred to the omission to take such precautions and to the fact that the dog had bitten the complainant and occasioned her grievous harm. The appellant was admitted to bail on making a cash payment. At his trial hearsay evidence was admitted to the effect that the appellant’s wife had told the complainant that the dog had a habit of biting women. There was no other evidence that the dog was naturally vicious; but the trial magistrate inferred, from the fact that the appellant’s home was fenced, that the dog was kept to protect the home; and relying on the evidence of what the appellant’s wife was supposed to have said, he convicted the appellant. He imposed a fine of Shs 700 or the alternative of six months’ imprisonment and, without discovering whether the appellant would pay the fine or go to prison, ordered the fine to be taken out of the cash bail. On appeal,

Held:

The appeal would be allowed, because:

1. The charge was defective in that there was no allegation of either rashness or negligence on the part of the appellant and one of these was an essential ingredient of an offence under section 243 of the Penal Code. Njenga v The Republic [1980] Kenya LR 89 followed.
2. In the absence of any evidence that the dog was naturally fierce or vicious, the appellant could not be said to have been negligent (or rash) in omitting to take appropriate precautions against any probable danger. Per curiam. An accused is entitled, when he appears as required, to the return of his cash bail. A magistrate does not have the right, on awarding the alternative of a monetary fine or a custodial sentence, to order the fine to be taken out of the cash bail.

Cases referred to in judgment:

1. Chebuye (Joseph Luliva) v The Republic (unreported) High Court  riminal Appeal No 921 of 1976.
2. Njenga v The Republic [1980] Kenya LR 89, Trevelyan and Chesoni JJ
3. R v Kinumbi s/o Thuo (unreported) High Court Criminal Revision Case No 267 of 1943.

Appeal

James Njoroge Kinyanjui appealed to the High Court (Criminal Appeal No 175 of 1980) against his conviction and sentence for omitting to take precautions against probable danger from an animal in his possession before the Second Class District Magistrates’ Court, Kiambu, in Criminal Case No 2738 of 1979. The facts are set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Trevelyan J.

Advocates

SP Vaid for the Appellant.

Mrs S Chana State Counsel for the Republic.

Festo Wandera Mukando and Michael Kariuki Waweru  v  Republic

High Court, Appellate Side, Nairobi

24th April 1980

Trevelyan & Chesoni JJ

Criminal Appeal Nos 641 and 642 of 1979

Criminal law – information - particulars of offence - inclusion of otiose words - accused not misled - no ground to quash conviction - Coffee Act (cap 333), section 13(1)(a).

Agriculture – coffee – licensing - trading without licence – transacting business - meaning of “transact” - Coffee Act (cap 333), section 13(1)(a).

Criminal law – trial - submission of no case to answer - rejection of submission - undesirability of detailed reasons for rejection.

The appellants did not hold a licence to deal in coffee under the Coffee Act, nor were they exempt from having any such licence. They were approached by a policeman (an agent provocateur) who inquired about purchasing coffee. They produced some coffee and negotiations were commenced. Subject to finalising the price to be paid, a bargain had been struck between the parties just before further police intervened and arrested the appellants. The appellants were charged with transacting business in coffee without a licence, contrary to section 13(1)(a) of the Act. The particulars of the offence alleged that the appellants “transacted a business of sale ... of coffee without being the holders of a current licence ……”, although section 13(1)(a) did not refer to transacting a business of sale (“ ... no person shall ... deal in or transact any business in coffee unless he is the holder of a current licence ...”). The prosecution case was that the transaction alleged was of a business nature rather than a domestic transaction. The appellants were convicted and sentenced. On their appeals against conviction,

Held:

The appeals against conviction would be dismissed, because:

1. The words “of sale” in the particulars of the offence were otiose; but as the appellants had not been misled as to the nature of the charge which they faced, nor confused, embarrassed or prejudiced, there was no ground on which to quash their convictions.
2. The word “transact” meant to conduct or negotiate about, to perform, to do business, to deal with or in, to have dealings, to treat, to have to do, and so on; accordingly, as there had been negotiation and treating between the parties and their arrangements had been frustrated only just before fruition by the intervention of the police, the parties had been transacting business within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Coffee Act and were guilty of the offence charged.

Brewin v Short (1855) 5 E & B 227, Krehl v Great Central Gas Co (1870) LR 5 Exch 289 and Barron v Littman [1952] 2 All ER 548 applied.

Wallis v Lomas (1890) The Times, 10th February distinguished.

Per curiam. It is inadvisable for a trial court to give reasons for holding that an accused has no case to answer (aliter, where a submission of no case to answer is upheld).

Cases referred to in judgment:

1. Barron v Littman [1952] 2 All ER 548, HL.
2. Brewin v Short (1855) 5 E&B 227, 24 LJQB 297; 25 LTOS 159; 119 ER 466.
3. Krehl v Great Central Gas Co (1870) LR 5 Exch 289, 39 LJ Ex 197;23 LT 72.
4. Wallis v Lomas (1890) The Times, 10th February.

Appeals

Festo Wandera Mukando and Michael Kariuki Waweru appealed to the High Court (Criminal Appeal Nos 641 and 642 of 1979) against their convictions and sentences in the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court, Nairobi, in Criminal Case No 1090 of 1979 for transacting business in coffee without a licence. The facts are set out in the judgement of the court delivered by Trevelyan J.

Advocates

Shadrack Opiyo Arum (instructed by Onyango Otieno & Co) for Festo Wandera Mukando.

Waweru did not appear and was not represented.

F Nabutete State counsel for the Republic.

Shah v Shah

High Court, at Nairobi April 9, 1980

Simpson J

Civil Case No 1981 of 1979

Injunction - ex parte injunction - dispensing with service in the face of urgency - effect of failure to provide for an undertaking - relevance of injunction to the subject matter of the relief claimed in the proceedings already initiated - possibility of obtaining a permanent injunction in interlocutory proceedings.

Lease - tenant in breach of a covenant - the right of such a tenant to an entitlement to a renewal of lease - when such a right is extinguished - when landlord is entitled to forfeiture of lease.

The dispute arose from a six year lease between a tenant and a landlord over shop premises. The tenant had failed to pay a proportion of site value tax within seven days of receiving a notice from the landlord. Accordingly, the lease became liable to forfeiture and when the landlord sought to regain possession so as to carry out demolition, the tenant obtained an ex parte injunction to stop the demolition. In their defence and counter claim the tenant sought relief from forfeiture and for his option to renew the lease as provided for to be affirmed. The landlord seeks to set aside the ex parte injunction and further prays for a permanent injunction restraining the tenant from trespassing in the shop premises occupied by him.

Held :

1. That where a matter is so urgent that if notice were to be served the mischief would be done before the injunction could be obtained, then service can be dispensed with.

2. That where a court overlooks to order for an undertaking in granting an injunction subject to it, this alone is insufficient reason for setting aside such an injunction.

3. That it is a well settled principle that an injunction sought in an interlocutory proceeding must bear some relationship to the cause of action in proceedings already initiated.

4. That there is no provision under Order XXXIX or in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 18 for granting a permanent injunction in interlocutory proceedings.

5. That where a tenant is in breach of a covenant conditional to a renewal of the lease, the option to exercise such renewal is extinguished and the landlord is entitled to forfeiture of the lease.

6. The ex parte injunction is set aside and the tenant is declared in breach.

Application allowed.

Cases

1. Montgomery v Montgomery [1964] 2 All ER 22

2. Winstone v Winstone [1959] 3 All ER 580

3. Des Salles d’Epinoix v Des Salles d’Epinoix [1967] 2 All ER 539

4. McGibbon v McGibbon [1973] 2 All ER 836

Statutes

1. Landlord and Tenant (Shop, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (Cap 301)

2. Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21, Sub Leg) Order XXXIX

3. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 114

4. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 Section 25(8)

Advocates

Mr DN Khanna for Applicants

Mr Lakha & Mr Hira for Respondent

Charles Mwaniki Kababi v Republic

High Court, Appellate Side, Nairobi

27th March 1980

Trevelyan J

Criminal Appeal No 9 of 1980

Traffic - dangerous driving - causing death by - failure to charge each death separately - no miscarriage of justice.

Criminal law - information - charge - amendment of charge - failure to comply with statutory procedure following amendment - conviction not necessarily invalid - Criminal Procedure Code (cap 75), section 214(1).

Criminal law – sentence - factors affecting sentence - death of victim of crime.

The appellant was charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Three deaths were alleged in one count. However, no objection was raised at the appellant’s trial by his counsel to the fact that there was only one count. The charge was itself amended during the course of the trial and, notwithstanding the mandatory requirements of section 214(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate did not call upon the appellant to plead to the amended charge; nor did she inquire whether the defence wanted any witness recalled. The appellant’s counsel indicated, however, that she had no objection to the amendment. The appellant was convicted and appealed.

Held:

The appeal would be dismissed because:

1. Counsel had not objected to the single charge and it could not have occasioned any miscarriage of justice.
2. Although the provisions of section 214(1) were mandatory, failure to comply with them did not necessarily render the conviction a nullity; each case had to be viewed according to its circumstances and in the present case there had been no possibility of a miscarriage of justice. Observations on the relevance of the death of a victim when sentencing an offender for his crime.

Cases referred to in judgment:

1. Atito v The Republic [1975] EA 278, EACA.
2. Harries v R (1921) 8 KLR 186, EACA.
3. Khalif v The Republic [1973] EA 364, Sir James Wicks CJ and Trevelyan J.
4. R v Eneriko Sempala slo Yowana Batista (1936) 3 EACA 23.
5. Republic, The v Zakaria Shilisia AgweYu [1980] Kenya LR 62, CA.
6. Uganda v Khimchand Kalidas Shah [1966] EA 30, EACA.

Appeal

Charles Mwaniki Kababi appealed to the High Court (Criminal Appeal No 9 of 1980) against his conviction and sentence for causing death for dangerous driving in Traffic Case No 3190 of 1979 in the acting Resident Magistrate’s Court, Nairobi. The facts are set out in the judgment.

Advocates’

MTA Malik for the Appellant.

JM Bwonwongwa for the Republic.

Reginald Destro & 3 others v Attorney-General

High Court, Nairobi

21st March 1980

Simpson J

Civil Case No 2414 of 1979

Equity – acquiescence - scope of plea - plea in answer to claim that action ultra vires.

Land acquisition - necessary acquisition - criterion of necessity – whether purpose achievable by other means - Land Acquisition Act (cap 295), section 6(1).

Land acquisition – certificate by Minister – form - defective certificate - no error on face of document.

The plaintiffs had been the leasees of a farm and property comprising over 1000 acres under a 999-year lease for agricultural purposes and grazing only. The farm was adjacent to an industrial area. In 1969 the Commissioner of Lands offered to purchase part of the land, but the offer was not accepted; and in 1970 the commissioner advised the plaintiffs that he had been instructed to pursue the possible compulsory acquisition of the property. In 1972 negotiations between the plaintiffs and the Commissioner of Lands commenced for the purchase. Before the negotiations had been concluded, however, the Commissioner of Lands warned the Minister of Lands and Settlement that a prominent businessman might be interested in the property and that it was advisable to commence compulsory acquisition proceedings at once. The Minister issued a certificate for the compulsory acquisition on the same day. The certificate, which was headed “Land for Urban Development”, was in obsolete form: although it referred to section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it did not set out the matters on which the Minister needed to be satisfied, and stated that the land was needed for “a public purpose” (rather than for “the purposes of a public body”); and the certificate did not state the interests for which the acquisition was necessary. The plaintiffs accepted the compensation awarded, on being permitted a lease-back of 20 acres for three years and on being permitted to remit the whole of the award abroad.

There was no suggestion of dissatisfaction on their part. Between 1977 and 1979 some 199 acres of the property were allocated to persons other than public bodies for industrial development. Some parcels of the land which had been so allocated were later transferred at considerable profit to the transferors. The plaintiffs thereupon instituted proceedings challenging the validity of the compulsory acquisition order.

Held:

1. The plaintiffs claim was not barred by acquiescence, since acquiescence was no defence to a claim that the compulsory acquisition order was ultra vires; moreover, the plaintiffs had never in fact been put to any election as to their rights. Swallow & Pearson v Middlesex County Council [1953] 1 WLR 422 applied Ramsden v Dyson (1868) LR 1 HL 129 distinguished.
2. The test whether the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act could be achieved by any other means was not the proper test of what was “necessary” in section 6(1).
3. Although, on the facts, the actual timing of the authorisation of the compulsory acquisition of the land was governed by the need to prevent a speculator from frustrating the Government’s plans for developing the land, there was no question of reducing the amount of compensation which was payable to the plaintiffs and the acquisition was properly made in the interest of town and country planning and the development of the property for public benefit (cf section 6(1)(a)).
4. The reference in the Minister’s certificate to section 6(1) was sufficient (in effect) both to incorporate the matters on which the Minister had to be satisfied and also to cure the reference to “public purpose” (in mistake for “purposes of a public body”); the heading “Land for Urban Development” made the interests for which the compulsory acquisition was ordered sufficiently clear; accordingly, despite the mistakes in the drafting, there was no error on the face of the certificate and it was a valid document. R v Croke (1774) 1 Cowp 26, Re Kisima Farm Ltd [1978] Kenya LR 36 and Re Hardial Singh [1979] Kenya LR 18 distinguished.

Cases referred to in judgment:

1. Hardial Singh, Re [1979] Kenya LR 18 Simpson and Platt JJ.
2. Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850, [1970] 3 WLR 287, [1970] 2 All ER 871, HL(E).
3. Kisima Farm Ltd, Re [1978] Kenya LR 36, Hancox J.
4. Marania Ltd, Re (reported) Civil Application No 62 of 1978, Hancox J.
5. Municipal Council of Sydney v Campbell [1923] AC 338; 94 LJPC 65; 133 LT 63, PC.
6. Palmer v Minister of Housing and Local Government and Romford Corporation (1952) 3 P & CR 165, England CA.
7. R v Croke (1774) 1 Cowp 26, 98 ER 948, Lord Mansfield.
8. Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 12 Jur NS 506, HL(E).
9. Swallow & Pearson v Middlesex County Council [1953] 1 WLR 422; [1953] 1 All ER 580.

Action

Reginald Destro, Donald Destro and two others sued the Attorney-General on behalf of the Commissioner of Lands (Civil Case No 2414 of 1979) for an order to recover a farm and property which had been acquired compulsorily from them on the ground that the acquisition was ultra vires. The facts are set out in the judgment of Simpson J.

Advocates

Dobry QC, Inamdar and Sandhu for the Plaintiffs.

Shields QC and Ole Keiuwa for the Defendant.

Saheb v Hassanally

High Court, at Nairobi February 28, 1980

Muli J

Civil Case No 1299 of 1977

Landlord and tenant – tenancy – termination of – notice of termination – grounds for termination – reliance on alternative grounds – legality of.

Landlord and tenant – tenancy – notice of termination of – service of notice - what constitutes proper notice.

The plaintiff (landlord) issued a notice to the defendant (tenant) under section 4(2) of the Landlord, Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (cap 301). The plaintiff brought the action on the basis of the notice on the grounds that the notice was invalid and that the grounds on the notice averred in the alternative were null and void.

Held:

1. The Landlord, Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (cap 301) section 7 which provides grounds on which a landlord may seek to terminate the tenancy, does not prohibit reliance upon alternative grounds, however the landlord can only enforce one ground at a time.

2. Where a landlord relies on more than one ground in the alternative, upon the tenant complying or refusing to comply with the notice the landlord will be bound by the acceptance of any one ground or by refusal of all the grounds in the notice.

3. Service of a tenancy notice can be done using two methods; either by delivering to the tenant personally or to an adult member of his family or to a servant residing with him or employed in the premises or to an employee or by sending it by prepaid registered post to his last known address.

Plaintiff’s suit dismissed.

Cases

Woolf & another v Macharia [1971] EA 330

Texts

Simonds, V, et al (Eds) (1952-64) Halsbury’s Laws of England London: Butterworths 3rd Edn Vol VIII p 169

Statutes

1. Landlord and Tenant (Shop, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (cap 301) sections 4; 4(1),(2),(4),(6); 7; 10; Form A

2. Interpretation General Clauses Act (cap 2) section 72

Advocates

Mr Nowrojee for the Defendant

Mr Le Pelley for the Plaintiff